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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Long-term care (LTC) consists of services provided to people who cannot perform 
certain activities of daily living (ADL) – such as walking, bathing, dressing, toileting, or 
eating – due to chronic disease or disabilities for an extended period of time. LTC 
delivers assistance and care in a variety of settings, such as in one‟s private home, an 
assisted living facility, or a nursing facility.  
LTC represents one of the largest uninsured financial risks that older Americans 
confront. According to Brown and Finkelstein (2009), one-third of current 65-year olds 
will enter a nursing home at some point in the future. Other estimates indicate that 1 in 5 
people turning age 65 will need more than five years of LTC (Kemper, Komisar, and 
Alecxih, 2005/2006). Also, estimates indicate that about 7 in 10 people turning age 65 
today will die with needing long-term care (Feder, Komisar, and Friedland, 2007). On 
average, a nursing home charges $69,422 per year for a private room, and $61,116 per 
year for a semi-private room. A home health aide costs $18 to $20 per hour for a visit, 
and an assisted living facility costs $30,265 on average per year, just for basic services 
(Melnyk, 2005). Nationwide only 10 percent of LTC spending in 2004 was paid for by 
private insurance, while 18 percent was paid for out of pocket (Congressional budget 
Office, 2004). Nearly 72 percent of spending on LTC came from public funds such as 
Medicaid and Medicare (Feder, Komisar, and Friedland, 2007).  
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An active private LTC insurance market exists, but the market is small and few people 
actually purchase policies. The General Accounting Office (2006) estimates that 
nationwide, there are fewer than 7 million LTC insurance policies in force. Several 
theories have been offered as possible explanations why older people do not buy private 
LTC insurance, including the availability of Medicaid, misperceptions that Medicare or 
other policies cover LTC, beliefs that one‟s own risk of needing LTC services is small, or 
desires to simply rely on children or one‟s spouse for LTC needs.  
This dissertation explores another possibility: that private LTC insurance is simply 
“unaffordable” for most older Americans, and therefore they do not buy it. Like other 
goods and services, unless consumers believe they are able to bear the cost of private 
LTC insurance, they will not purchase it. This study provides an operational framework 
for defining affordability, and then uses data from the 2004 Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) to examine the extent to which the affordability of private LTC insurance, or the 
lack thereof, can explain why so few older adults purchase it.  
This study extends earlier work on the affordability of LTC insurance in three ways. 
First, it updates previous estimates of coverage affordability and refines the methods used 
to derive them. All of the estimates in the literature are now at least a decade old. Second, 
this study analyzes data from the 2004 HRS, a nationally representative sample of older 
Americans, which enables generalization of the findings to older adults nationwide in the 
U.S. Finally, in contrast to other studies, this study examines several alternative 
definitions for affordability, making it possible to assess the sensitivity of the finding to 
variations in the definition used. As a result, this study provides more general conclusions 
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regarding of the role of affordability in explaining why so few Americans purchase 
private LTC insurance.  
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature that 
contemplates the meaning of affordability in the context of LTC insurance, acute-care 
health insurance and in housing. These are goods and services where prior research exists 
on the notion of affordability. In chapter 3, a general description of the meaning of 
affordability is developed, and three different operational definitions of affordability of 
LTC insurance are offered. In chapter 4, the definitions are applied to the 2004 HRS 
dataset. Chapter 5 reports the results. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with a 
synthesis of the key finding that emerge. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There are three relevant areas of prior research: (1) studies on the demand for LTC 
insurance, (2) studies on the affordability of acute-care health insurance, and (3) studies 
on the affordability of housing.  
 
LTC Insurance 
Cohen et al. (1993) point out that there is no real agreement on the reasons why so 
relatively few seniors carry LTC policies. They suggest there are two good reasons, 
however, to examine the issue of affordability. First, the role of the public sector in 
financing LTC will in part be determined by whether private LTC insurance can solve the 
problems faced by middle-income elders. Second, clarifying the reasons for the low 
demand for LTC insurance may provide insights about how best to design market 
policies and to attract purchasers.   
They reveal that middle-income elders comprise a sizable proportion of the growing 
LTC insurance market: about one-third of purchasers have income less than $20,000 and 
about 25% have assets less than $30,000. They also present that both age and risk 
evaluation are important components in the decision about how much to spend on LTC 
insurance. For the typical policy, individuals 65 to 69 years old pay $73 per day for about 
6 years of nursing home care, but purchasers over age 75 cover 4 years of nursing home 
care at $65 per day. Individuals who evaluate their risk for needing nursing home care as 
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greater than 75 percent are willing to pay about 45 percent more of their income on LTC 
insurance than those who assess their risk to be less than 25 percent. In contrast to other 
studies, their paper shows that there are between 60 percent and 70 percent purchasers 
who use some proportion of their savings to buy LTC insurance. They conclude that 
private insurance may be a reasonable way to finance for more people than once thought, 
especially for individuals 65 to 74 years old.  They also suggest that middle-income 
elders can look to the private LTC insurance as an alternative way as long as the federal 
government does not significantly change its current role in direct financing of LTC 
through the Medicaid program. 
Crown et al. (1992) developed a conceptual model of the demand for private LTC 
insurance that illuminates the factors affecting demand, including the affordability of 
coverage. From the perspective of affordability, they suggest the potential buyers of 
private LTC insurance are individuals who are ineligible for Medicaid and who have 
sufficiently large assets to both warrant protection and achieve protection in the face of 
uncovered costs. Based on the restriction that only nursing home care is defined as LTC, 
they construct a model suggesting that perfectly rational individuals will consider buying 
private LTC insurance only after they meet their daily expenses.  
They report that the size of the potential market for private LTC insurance differs by 
age, marital status, the percentage of income that an individual is willing to pay on 
premiums, and the cost of the premiums themselves. Among married individuals aged 
65-69, they estimated that 64 percent could afford to spend half of their discretionary 
income on a typical basic plan, which covers 4 years in a nursing home, with a $100 daily 
6 
 
 
benefit, no inflation protection, and a $2,000 deductible. Their estimates of the potential 
market for LTC insurance suggest less affordability than those of previous studies, so 
they conclude the actual LTC insurance market could be expected to be far smaller.  
Zedlewski and McBride (1992) address two questions: what the future need for LTC 
services is likely to be, and whether LTC insurance will be affordable for a large portion 
of the future elderly population. They compute the ratio of premiums to income in 1990, 
and estimate that in 2030 only 10.6 percent of the elderly ages 65-69 will be able to 
purchase a fairly generous private LTC insurance at a cost of less than 5 percent of their 
income. 
Cohen et al. (1987) examine the financial capacity of the elderly to purchase either 
LTC insurance or coverage in a managed care environment (MCE) such as a continuing 
care retirement community (CCRC). After reviewing 16 LTC insurance policies, they 
find that annual premiums of LTC insurance range from $400 to $1,400 in year, 
depending on age of purchasing and the extent of coverage. They estimate income, assets 
and expenditure of the elderly. They assume that the elderly would be inclined to spend 
only between 10 percent and 25 percent of their assets on a purchase of LTC insurance. 
Moreover they make two adjustments to estimate the discretionary resources: excluding 
the costs of MCE, and accounting for the lump-sum entry fees of CCRC. As a result, they 
find that if a married couple household is willing to devote 10 percent of their 
discretionary income to purchase LTC insurance premiums, and is charged $50 per 
month on each person; only 9 percent of the elderly could afford total premiums. 
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Acute-care Health Insurance 
More recently, Bundorf and Pauly (2006) have investigated the affordability of acute-
care health insurance. The question they seek to answer is: “How many of the uninsured 
in the U.S. are uninsured because they cannot afford health insurance?” Using a 
normative approach to defining affordability, they estimate the proportion of the 
uninsured who cannot afford coverage. According to their normative definition, health 
insurance is affordable as long as there are sufficient resources left over for health 
insurance after buying a “socially acceptable” level of non-health insurance goods and 
services. They note that at the poverty level, 82 percent of the uninsured could afford 
health insurance for a year. By raising the “socially acceptable” allowance for other 
goods to two times the poverty level, 55 percent of individuals could afford coverage for 
a year. They report that increasing the level of income relative to the poverty threshold 
dramatically reduces the proportion of the uninsured who could afford to buy health 
insurance.  
They conclude that the normative definition shows that individuals with higher income 
are more able to afford health insurance. For the effects of policies on affordability higher 
premiums make health insurance less affordable, due to either higher loading costs or 
higher expected health care expenditures, which leaves less available income to spend on 
other goods and services. 
According to their alternative, behavioral definition, if with the median preferences 
individuals purchase at least the adequate amount of health insurance at a certain level of 
income, then health insurance is said to be affordable to individuals with the same level 
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of income. To define affordability, they set the threshold probability at 0.5, and in 
addition, use alternative values. By applying the threshold of 0.5, to the model including 
only controls for financial resources they find that health insurance was affordable to 74 
percent of the uninsured. On the other hand, 25 percent of them can afford health 
insurance when the threshold is set at 0.8. 
Therefore, increasing the affordability threshold makes less uninsured be able to 
afford health insurance. In contrast to the normative definition, higher loading, holding 
expected expenditures constant, diminishes the probability that individuals buy private 
coverage, making health insurance appear to be less affordable. 
Blumberg et al. (2007) offered two definitions for the affordability of acute care health 
insurance. The first was based on household budget approach, and the second was based 
on patterns of actual household spending on health insurance. The household budget 
definition states that consumers at every income level spend their resources on living 
expenses, and then the remainder is available for health care. The second approach 
reflects consumers‟ actual purchasing decisions, and then reveals what they are both 
willing and able to spend.  
Bernard et al. (2009) point out that income along does not fully explain insurance 
purchase decisions, because there are unafforders who buy insurance, and afforders who 
do not buy insurance. They suggest that a role for assets and debt in determining the 
affordability of health insurance. They introduce a wealth model that adds savings, assets, 
and debt to the standard income model. They find that in the employer coverage market 
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the standard income model performs well, but in the individual market the wealth model 
performs substantially better that the standard model. 
 
Housing Market 
Thalmann (1999) developed a conventional ratio definition of housing affordability 
and a quality-based definition. The former one states that housing is affordable for a 
household if the ratio of the housing costs to income is less than or equal to some limit. A 
quality-based definition, a variant of the conventional definition, sets the particular level 
of housing cost which society would find suitable for a given type of household. If the 
ratio of the particular housing cost to income does not exceed the limit, then households 
can afford appropriate housing. To estimate the average market cost of housing, he uses a 
hedonic approach that is a function of attributes and residual determinants of rent 
differentials.  
Stone (2006) points out that there are practically a variety of different approaches to 
defining affordability as well as either a ratio or a difference approaches. A relative 
approach, first, investigates changes in the relationship between summary measures of 
house prices and household incomes. A subjective approach is based on the idea that 
households are utility-maximizers, so they pay what they can afford for housing. Thus, it 
is not possible to have a normative standard of affordability other than individual choice. 
Next, a family budget standards approach conceptualizes monetary standards based on 
actual, aggregate households‟ expenditure patterns. A ratio definition claims that if a 
household pays more for housing than a certain percentage of its income, it doesn‟t have 
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sufficient income for other goods and services. Finally, a residual approach asserts that a 
household experiences a housing affordability problem when it cannot satisfy its basic 
non-housing needs after paying for housing. 
Belsky et al. (2005) note there are benefits to using a cost-to-income ratio definition of 
affordability. This approach needs only income and housing cost to compute a ratio, so it 
is both easy to compute and understand. It is applied across places, to trace changes over 
time and to explore differences in these ratios across households. Finally, it is an 
immediate measure of actual expenses of households relative to their actual incomes.   
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CHAPTER 3 
CONCENPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. THE MEANINGS OF AFFORDABILITY 
“Afford” is defined as being able to bear a cost.1 Since deciding the level of the 
bearable cost is subjective, there is no single, agreed upon definition for affordability. In 
general, in referring to the affordability of a certain good (or service), we are considering 
the amount of financial burden to a consumer. Most definitions recognize that consumers 
have competing demands on their income. Housing, food, and other basic essentials will 
be consumed before more discretionary goods and services are considered. Accordingly, 
a consumption bundle which allows for these basic living expenses, as well as LTC 
insurance, is said to be affordable if it is feasible for a consumer given her income and the 
prices she faces.  
Here to see a general meaning of affordability, I review the model developed by Mas-
Colell et al. (1995). The model is particularly useful because it recognizes that the 
consumer‟s problem is actually a multiperiod one, and a consumer must be able to afford 
what they purchase in each and every period. With her income in each period every 
consumer faces the decision problem to choose consumption levels of the various goods 
and services. Suppose that, in the market, there are l commodities that are available for 
purchase. The consumer can have a list of purchases  (𝑥1, 𝑥2 ,⋯ , 𝑥𝑙) , where 𝑥𝑖  is the 
quantity of the i
th
 commodity. Each quantity 𝑥𝑖  belongs to R𝐿
+ because purchases cannot 
                                                          
1
 Merriam-Webster dictionary. 
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be negative. Let x be a particular consumption bundle for the consumer, then she has 
x = (x1, x2, ⋯, 𝑥𝑙). Then the consumer‟s problem is to choose an affordable consumption 
bundle x in the consumption set 𝑿 ⊂ R𝐿
+ that yields the most satisfaction. In addition, 
suppose that the consumer lives the t-period, and then the particular consumption bundle 
for the consumer during the t-period becomes:  
x1 =  𝑥1
1, 𝑥2
1 , 𝑥3
1 ,⋯ , 𝑥𝑙
1 , 
x2 =  𝑥1
2, 𝑥2
2 , 𝑥3
2 ,⋯ , 𝑥𝑙
2 , 
⋮ 
x𝑡 =  𝑥1
𝑡 , 𝑥2
𝑡 , 𝑥3
𝑡 ,⋯ , 𝑥𝑙
𝑡 . 
The consumer, then, has consumption set, 𝑿 , which contains all bundles of L 
commodities: 
𝑿 = R𝐿
+ = {x ∈ R𝐿 : 𝑥𝑙
𝑡≥ 0 for l = 1, . . . , L, t=1,……T}. 
 Suppose that each good at each period has its own price. The price vector, P, which 
defines dollar cost for a unit of each of the L commodities: 
P = {p ∈ R𝐿: 𝑝𝑙
𝑡  >0 for l = 1, . . . , L, t=1,……T}. 
Then, we can say that the affordability of a consumption bundle relies on the market 
prices, p, and the consumer‟s income in dollars, y. A consumption bundle is affordable if 
its total cost, given prices, does not exceed the consumer‟s income, that is, if: 
𝑝1
1𝑥1
1 + 𝑝2
1𝑥2
1 + ⋯+  𝑝𝑙
1𝑥𝑙
1  ≤  𝑦1, 
𝑝1
2𝑥1
2 +  𝑝2
2𝑥2
2 + ⋯+  𝑝𝑙
2𝑥𝑙
2  ≤  𝑦2, 
⋮ 
𝑝1
𝑡𝑥1
𝑡 +  𝑝2
𝑡𝑥2
𝑡 +  ⋯+  𝑝𝑙
𝑡𝑥𝑙
𝑡  ≤  𝑦𝑡 , 
13 
 
 
X 
I 
 
𝐼   
𝑋  
𝑌  
O 
E 
In general, we can write the set of consumption bundles that satisfies this criterion, 
given p and y is: 
Bp·y = {x ∈ R𝐿
+: P · X ≤ y}.     
This framework provides a precise definition of affordability for aggregate 
consumption. A consumption bundle is affordable if it is feasible for a consumer given 
her income and the prices she faces. The consumer‟s problem is to choose a particular 
consumption bundle, x , from this set, given p and y.  
 
3.2.  FIRST DEFINITION 
Based on the general model of resource allocation, I develop a first definition of 
affordability of private LTC insurance. Households are assumed to spend their income on 
private LTC insurance and other goods and services. When considering this first 
definition, we should specify the adequate amount of other goods and services as well as 
that of LTC insurance.  
 
Figure 1. General model of affordability 
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 At first, let I and X represent the quantity of LTC insurance and other goods and 
services, respectively. In Figure 1 let 𝐼   illustrate the socially defined minimum amount of 
LTC insurance, and 𝑋  do other minimum standard of consumption of all other goods and 
services, that is, minimum consumption level externally defined by society. Point E, 
therefore, represents a minimum need consumption bundle for a household. To spend 𝑋  
and 𝐼  , that is, point E, the household needs certain amount of income 𝑌 . We can say, 
therefore, 𝑌  is the socially required minimum level of income.  
 
Figure 2. Comparison between afforders and non-afforders 
 
 
 Then, how can we use this to measure affordability for LTC insurance? If 𝑌  is 
supposed as household income which can achieves point E, then the household which has 
𝑌  or higher can afford at least amount of private LTC insurance. It is shown at the left 
graph in Figure 2. In other words, if the household has income Y that is greater than or 
equal to 𝑌 , then it has sufficient income to buy 𝑋  and 𝐼  . We, therefore, classify the 
household as being able to afford LTC insurance. All households with incomes below 𝑌 , 
however, would not have the adequate amount of incomes to purchase the socially 
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minimum amount of private LTC insurance. Therefore, we can say these households 
cannot afford LTC insurance, as shown at the right graph in Figure 2. This basic idea is 
embodied in the first normative definition for affordability, which is: 
 
 DEF 1. A private LTC insurance policy with coverage 𝐼   that costs 𝑃∗is said to be 
affordable for a household, i, if:  
𝑦𝑖
𝑡 −  𝑥 𝑖
𝑡  ≥  𝑝𝑖
∗2004 𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼  𝑖 ,          𝑡 = 2004, 2005, 2006,… ,𝑇.   
 
Life expectancy, T, is used because lifetime values should be considered for affordability 
of LTC insurance. y stands for the non-purchase household‟s income. p* represents the 
premium of a socially defined minimum LTC insurance when private LTC insurance, 𝐼  , 
and varies with characteristics of household members, D. The price of x is set as 1, and so 
𝑥 illustrates costs for other consumption. LTC insurance is affordable to household i if in 
each remaining year of life, its remaining income is greater than or equal to the sum of its 
expenses for LTC insurance and its spending on other goods and services. Finally, 
savings are allowed from year to year. If household i has income that is more than 
enough for meeting its budget constraint, then its remaining income can be saved and 
used to buy private LTC insurance in the next period, if needed.  
 
3.3.  SECOND DEFINITION 
Following the definition used in earlier studies of affordability of LTC insurance and 
housing affordability, the second definition examines the relationship between premium 
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and income. One broadly accepted approach in studies of housing to measure the 
affordability is the ratio of housing costs to income.  That is, affordability is explained as 
the relationship between household income and housing expenditure; housing is 
affordable if expenditure relative to income is reasonable. The conventional view defines 
a housing affordability problem to occur when housing cost exceed 30% of income. 
First, it identifies that households spend a fraction of income on LTC insurance, and 
then demonstrates that if households spend more on LTC insurance than a certain 
(threshold) percentage of their incomes, they are considered as not having sufficient 
income left for other spending so that they are not able to afford LTC insurance.  
 
Figure 3. Affordability – Second Definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suppose households spend some of their income Y to buy LTC insurance I. At any 
given set of relative prices of income and LTC insurance, the second definition of 
affordability can be represented as OA, in Figure 3. OA shows the least income that is 
Other 
goods 
LTC Ins 
A 
O 
p 
q 
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necessary to purchase a certain amount of LTC insurance without spending more than the 
proportion, some limit, of that income. The slope of the ray relies on both the ratio of 
LTC insurance premiums to income and the relative prices of the two goods. Any point 
on the line, therefore, is pairs of premiums relative to incomes which equal the target 
ratio. Points above the ray, area p in Figure 3, represent ratios of premiums to incomes 
below the target level. In other words, for those incomes, the premiums are not an 
excessive burden on households so that LTC insurance is affordable for households. Any 
households, however, below the line, area q in Figure 3, describe ratios that exceed the 
reasonable charge, and so they cannot afford LTC insurance. The second definition is 
defined for affordability is given by: 
 
DEF 2. A private LTC policy with coverage 𝐼   that costs 𝑃∗  is affordable during a 
household’s lifetime if the household’s share-of-income is less than or equal to the target 
ratio, M. In other words, if the ratio of household i’s LTC insurance premium to its 
income is greater than the threshold ratio, then the household cannot afford LTC 
insurance: 
𝑝𝑖
∗2004 𝐷𝑖 , 𝐼  𝑖 
𝑦𝑖
𝑡  ≤ 𝑀,          𝑡 = 2004, 2005, 2006,… ,𝑇.   
 
3.4.   THIRD DEFINITION 
The third (or behavioral) definition of affordability is based on the actual purchasing 
behavior of consumers. A non-purchaser is considered as being able to afford LTC 
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insurance if she has characteristics similar to those of a purchaser, e.g. her financial 
covariates, as well as demographic, income, employment, and health status variables are 
similar to those of a buyer. As an example, suppose that there are two individuals, A and 
B. A has LTC insurance, B does not. Both, however, have comparable income, residence, 
financial wealth, health status, and so on.  Then, the third definition classifies B as being 
able to afford LTC insurance. 
The behavioral definition considers what individuals actually do purchase, instead of 
exploring what individuals could buy. Suppose there are individuals who have the 
normatively defined income. They want to consume less of LTC than the normative 
standard, instead of preferring to purchase more acceptable levels of other goods and 
services. Conversely, there might be individuals who purchase more of LTC insurance 
and less of other spending than each normative criterion. The behavioral definition 
reflects these cases.  
 
Figure 4. Affordability – Third Definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐼   
 
𝐼  
Other 
goods 
LTC Ins 
 
OE
′
 
OE 
𝑌  
𝑋  
𝑌  
O 
𝑋  
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Graphically, in Figure 4, OE represents the allocation between the socially minimum 
LTC insurance and other consumption with the level of income at which the LTC 
insurance is affordable. Suppose an individual, however, has a preference OE
′ rather than 
OE. In this case, 𝐼 <  𝐼  . That is, with the normatively defined minimum adequate income, 
𝑌 , the individual purchases less adequate LTC insurance, 𝐼 . Instead, she buys more than 
adequate levels of other goods and services, 𝑋 .   Under this preference, sufficient 
individual income should be 𝑌  to achieve socially minimum level of LTC insurance, 𝐼  . In 
this case, the adequate income is greater than that of the normative definition, 𝑌 >  𝑌 . 
Suppose that 𝐼 (𝑌, 𝑐)  represents the quantity of LTC insurance consumed by the 
individual, and is a function of Y and c. I define LTC insurance is affordable if, given Y 
and c, 𝐼 (𝑌, 𝑐)  ≥  𝐼  . That is, if the individual purchases at least the adequate amount of 
LTC insurance at a specified level of income, LTC insurance is said to be affordable for 
the individual with that level of income. For example, on the left graph in Figure 5, 
suppose that the line OM represents the allocation between LTC insurance and other 
goods and services given income 𝑌′ and c. When the individual has the preference OM, 
she needs at least income 𝑌  to purchase the adequate quantity of LTC insurance 𝐼  . The 
individual‟s available income, however, is 𝑌′ which is greater than 𝑌 , and is sufficient to 
purchase 𝐼′ , so that she can afford LTC insurance. With the third definition LTC 
insurance is deemed affordable for not only this individual, but also other individuals 
who have the same amount of income and who face the same prices. In the same way, we 
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can imagine the case of unaffordability on the right graph in Figure 5. The behavioral 
definition is: 
 
DEF 3.  (Based not on people who could purchase private LTC insurance, but on 
them who actually do purchase it) If the individual purchases the minimum level of 
private LTC insurance in particular circumstances, e.g. who face the same parameters 
for their choice problem.  
 
Figure 5. Affordable and Unaffordable – Third Definition 
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CHAPTER 4 
APPLICATIONS OF DEFINITIONS 
 
4.1. DATA 
This study uses nationally representative data from the ongoing Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS) and the Rand HRS data. The HRS survey is conducted by the Institute for 
Social Research at the University of Michigan, with funding from the National Institute 
on Aging (NIA). Prior to 1998, the HRS consisted of two sub-studies. One is the original 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which surveyed a cohort born between 1931 and 
1941 with age 51-61 at a baseline, and the other is the Study of Asset and Health 
Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD), which surveyed another cohort born in or 
before 1923. Starting from 1998 (wave 4), the two sub-studies were merged and new sub-
samples were added so that they create one complete panel of respondents representing 
all persons over 50 years old in the United States. The combined HRS surveys more than 
22,000 Americans over age 50 every two years, and provides extensive information on 
the utilization of formal LTC services and informal care, as well as demographic 
characteristics, family structure, financial resources, employment, insurance coverage, 
and health and disability.  
 The Rand Center for the Study of Aging created and maintains the Rand HRS data 
files with funding and support from the National Institute on Aging (NIA) and the Social 
Security Administration (SSA). It contains data from all waves of the HRS on a subset of 
variables in the “core interviews,” whereas the HRS contains wave-specific files and 
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includes several auxiliary and special topic files for each wave. Within the 2004 HRS 
data I use a sample of 12,577 adults ages 50 and older. The Rand HRS data is used to 
augment these data. Specifically, for respondents with missing values the Rand HRS 
provides data from previous waves to impute the missing values. 
 
4.2. METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FIRST DEFINITION 
Purchasers of LTC insurance have to pay their premiums annual throughout their 
remaining lifetime. Therefore, in examining the affordability of LTC insurance, lifetime 
values, such as lifetime income and lifetime other consumptions etc., instead of just using 
current income and current consumptions should be considered, not just current income 
and current consumption. To estimate lifetime values, life expectancy should be predicted. 
Although HRS data collects respondents‟ life expectancy, unless respondent reports their 
life expectancy, I estimate time-to-death using the Life Table for the Total Population, 
2004, from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS).  
 
4.2.1. Lifetime household income  
Two different groups, current workers and current retirees, should be considered 
separately when lifetime income is examined, because they have different income sources. 
For current workers they have two income sources in their lifetime. One is wages from a 
current job, and the other is (future) retirement income after retiring. In contrast, current 
retirees have only one income source, retirement income. 
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A. Current workers 
A life span of current workers is divided into two periods, in Figure 6, work years and 
retirement. In order to divide these two periods, I first need to estimate a retirement year 
(R) for every respondent. I assign the average retirement year, computed from other 
respondents‟ retirement years in the past, unless a respondent does not report it. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports that older Americans are remaining in the labor 
force relatively later in their life. Although labor force participation rates of older 
Americans had been dropping until 1985, they have been rising since then. In fact, HRS 
data also demonstrate results similar to BLS reports. An average retirement year is 
computed on every age (or respondent) based on expected retirement years of other 
respondents from wave 1 to wave 6 of Rand HRS data. It demonstrates that the average 
expected retirement age was 54.6 years old in 1992, but in 2002 it reached an average of 
age 60.5. For even the elderly aged 65 and older, they expect to work 2 to 8 more years. 
Over the past two decades, workers have tended to extend their working lives for the 
purpose of earning more wages that would be considered as an important source of 
retirement income. The BLS estimates relatively modest growth in the participation of 
older Americans in the future. The rates for workers aged 65 and older are projected to 
increase by about 3 percentage points over the next 15 and 20 years, compared to 13.1 
percent of them in 2001. 
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Figure 6. Time span for current workers 
 
 
Work incomes from year 1 to year R - 1 for every worker are estimated based on 
current work income (CWI) converted to present values, and then added from current(0) 
to a retirement year(R) for total work income (TWI) in year t.   
𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑖
𝑡 =   
1 + 𝑔
1 + 𝑟
 
𝑡
×  𝐶𝑊𝐼𝑖
𝑡 ,          𝑡 = 2004, 2005, 2006,… ,𝑅 − 1.  
where g stands for an average real economic growth rate from OECD Country Statistical 
Profiles of the U.S. between 1971 and 2007 and r is a real interest rate from OECD 
Country Statistical Profiles of the U.S. in 2004 to convert values to present ones. 
 
 Next, since there is no specific amount of current workers‟ retirement income, I 
estimate the income of first retirement year, H. Before estimating H, life expectancy, T, 
needs to be considered. Life expectancy at birth stands for the average number of years 
that a group of infants would live if the infants were to experience throughout life the 
age-specific death rates present in the year of birth (National Vital Statistics Reports, 
2007). For the U.S. population, life expectancy reached a record high of 77.8 years in 
2004, rising from 77.4 years in 2003.  
 The HRS asks each respondent to report a specific ages for their life expectancy. 
Unless the respondent reports his or her life expectancy, I follow the Life Table for the 
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Total Population (2004) from National Center for Health Statistics. According to it, a 
person aged 65 years could anticipate living an average of 18.7 more years for a total of 
83.7 years. In the case of a person aged 85, he or she may look forward to living 6.8 more 
years on average. 
Consider an individual‟s income in year t of retirement. Call this H. It is calculated by 
multiplying an individual‟s average work income, from 2004 until R - 1, by the income 
“replacement rate”, 𝛾.2  After calculating retirement income in each remaining year of 
life. I add these values up from year R to year T to obtain the person‟s retirement income 
(TRI) in year t for every current worker.  
𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑡 =    
1 + 𝑔
1 + 𝑟
 
𝑡
×   
 𝑌𝑖
𝑡𝑅−1
𝑡=0
𝑅
 × 𝛾   ,          𝑡 = 𝑅,𝑅 + 1,𝑅 + 2,… ,𝑇 
                                                          
2
 Replacement rates are used to measure the extent to which older people can maintain their pre-retirement 
levels of consumption once they retire. Although the comparison working consumption with retirement one, 
such data are hardly possible so that an indirect approach is to compare pre- and post-retirement income. I 
use the replacement rate constructed by Munnell and Soto (2005).  
In the U.S. retirement income system, Social Security serves a basic level of replacement, upon which 
individuals can have additional saving. This additional saving comes mainly from employer-sponsored 
pension plans and the accumulation of home equity even though most people save very little besides 
pensions and their home. They defined retirement as the first year that workers start receiving Social 
Security benefits.   
To compute replacement rates, they use HRS since it has information on earnings before retirement and 
on Social Security and pension benefits as well as 401(K) balances and homeownership.  
Without pensions: 
median replacement rate =
Social Security Benefits 
AIME
,  
where AIME represents average indexed monthly earnings, which is the 35 highest years of earnings 
indexed to the present by wage growth. For retirees, the AIME is computed in two steps. First, the worker‟s 
annual taxable incomes since 1950 are indexed to indicate the general income level in the indexing year, at 
age 60. 
Income after age 60 is not indexed but is continued at their actual value. A worker‟s income prior to age 
60 is indexed by multiplying it by the ratio of the average wage in the national economy for the indexing 
year to the corresponding average wage figure for the year to be indexed. 
Second, the AIME is computed by taking the highest 35 years of wage-indexed income between age 22 
and 62 and dividing that total by the number of months in that period. 
With pensions: 
median replacement rate =
Social Security Benefits + Pensions 
AIME
.     
They provide the replacement rate for couples and singles separately. 
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These two components of income, total work income, 𝑇𝑊𝐼𝑖 , and total retirement 
income, 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖 , are then added together to give us a current workers‟ total expected 
income:  
Expected income in year t =   
1+𝑔
1+𝑟
 
𝑡
×  𝐶𝑊𝐼𝑖
𝑡 +   
1+𝑔
1+𝑟
 
𝑡
×  𝐻𝑖
𝑡 ,           
𝑡 = 2004, 2005, 2006,… ,𝑇. 
  
B. Current retirees 
Because current retirees have only retirement years left (Figure 7), their lifetime 
income, based on current retirement income, can be easily estimated. After determining 
the retirement income, H, total retirement income is calculated by the same method with 
that of current worker‟s total retirement income.  
 
Figure 7. Time span for current retirees 
 
 
Given life expectancy (T) of every respondent, retirement incomes from 1 to T are 
estimated based on current total retirement income converted to present values, and then 
added from current (0) to life expectancy (T) for total retirement income.  
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Expected income in year t =  
1+𝑔
1+𝑟
 
𝑡
×  𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑡 , 
𝑡 = 2004, 2005, 2006,… ,𝑇. 
 
C. Setting Parameters for these Equations  
Lifetime Household Consumption. For consumption on other goods and services, I 
use the poverty threshold released by U.S. Census Bureau. The poverty thresholds is a 
most widely-used measurement of what income level is necessary (or adequate) to 
survive. It was originally developed in 1964 by the Social Security Administration. They 
were based on the Economy Food Plan, the cheapest of four food plans developed by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, which described the plan as designed for “temporary or 
emergency use when funds are low” (Kutty 2005). By being revised every year the 
threshold adjust for price changes.  There are separate income levels for 48 categories of 
family composition. Family composition is defined by the number of resident family 
members, the number of under 18 years old, and the age of the head of household. 
Though the threshold is different for the family-size, it does not adjust to reflect different 
cost of living in various locations of the country.  
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Table 1. Spending Thresholds for “Other Expenses” 
Size of family unit 
Threshold 
(no child) 
2 times 
threshold 
3 times 
threshold 
4 times 
threshold 
One person     
Under 65 years $9,827 $19,654 $29,481 $39,308 
65 years and older 9,060 18,120 27,180 36,240 
Two persons     
Householder under 65 years 12,649 25,298 37,947 50,596 
Householder 65 years  + 11,418 22,836 34,254 45,672 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.  
 
For the criteria of sufficient consumption to live on, I consider four different 
thresholds, defined as one, two, three, and four times the current U.S. poverty standard. 
In Table 1, a single person aged 65 or over needs $9,060 per year for his or her living. If 
the threshold is tripled, then the single person household spends $27,180 to live. With the 
same threshold when two persons consist of a household, and the head of the household 
is at 65-year-old or over, they need $34,254 to live. 
 
Benefit Provisions and Cost of LTC Insurance. I consider four alternative LTC 
policies, specifically, the four policies available under the Federal LTC insurance 
program for federal employees. The Federal Government sponsors four different policies: 
“Facilities 100,” “Comprehensive 100,” “Comprehensive 150,” and “Comprehensive 
150+,” ordered from least- to most-generous in terms of their coverage. Table 2 describes 
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the coverage of these four policies. The least-generous policy, Policy 1 (or Facilities 100), 
covers only facility-based care, and policy holders have to wait 90 days before being 
covered. If holders choose a longer waiting period, then they pay lower premium. With 
Policy 1, the benefit per day is $100 for 3 years. The most-generous policy provides both 
facility-based and home-based care. Its daily benefit is $150 without the limitation of 
benefit period after 90 days of waiting period. 
 
Table 2. LTC Provisions Used for Simulations Policies 1 through 4 Ordered from 
Least- to Most-Generous   
 
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
Policy name Fac100 
Comprehensive 
100 
Comprehensive 
150 
Comprehensive 
150+ 
Benefits 
Facility-based 
care 
Facility- and 
home-based care 
Facility- and 
home-based care 
Facility- and 
home-based care 
Inflation 
protection 
No No Yes Yes 
Benefit period 3yrs 3yrs 5yrs Unlimited 
Waiting period 90days 90days 90days 90days 
Daily benefit $100.00 $100.00 $150.00 $150.00 
Source: Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program 
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 How much premium must policy holders pay for coverage under these policies? 
This was calculated using the Federal LTC insurance premium (FLTCIP) calculator, 
available on-line (https://www.ltcfeds.com/ltcWeb/do/assessing_your_needs/ratecalcOut). 
Table 3 reports illustrative LTC insurance monthly premiums by age at time of purchase, 
based on this calculator. A sixty-year-old individual, for example, pays $27.80 per month 
if he or she chooses Policy 1. If the individual‟s initial age of purchasing is, however, at 
70 or 80, then he or she has to pay $63.20 or $190.79 per month, respectively, for the 
same policy.  
 
Table 3. LTC Monthly Premiums in 2004 by Policy Type and Age  
Age Policy 1  Policy 2  Policy 3  Policy 4  
60 
$27.80 $40.60 $93.20 $231.59 
70 63.20 86.80 154.40 379.20 
80 190.79 258.60 369.19 913.80 
90 412.04 558.21 732.07 1811.26 
Source: Calculated using rates paid by federal employees  
under the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program.  
 
4.3. METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SECOND DEFINITION 
According to Stone (2006), the rationale for the conventional ratio standard has been 
built on interpretations of empirical studies of what households actually spend for 
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housing. He states also that it makes the ratio standard become legitimated as appropriate 
indicator. 
 Households use some of their income to purchase LTC insurance. A fraction of 
income is spent on LTC insurance. By computing the ratio of the premium to the incomes 
of the older adults based on lifetime income and lifetime premiums that were developed 
in the previous section, we can represent that LTC insurance policy is affordable only if 
the resulting ratio is less than or equal to the threshold affordability ratio. As a result, the 
percentage of elderly households who could afford LTC insurance, based on a ratio 
criterion for affordability, can be estimated.  
The big question is where to set the threshold ratio (Stone, 2006). There are a few 
studies of Americans‟ willingness to buy LTC insurance (America‟s Health Insurance 
Plans, 2007; LifePlans, Inc., 2000). They suggest that most households are unwilling to 
spend more than 5 percent of their income on LTC insurance. There are other studies that 
examine how much of their income buyers actually spend on LTC insurance. The Health 
Insurance Association of America (prepared by LifePlans, Inc., 2000) reveals from 
surveys that purchasers spent on an average 4.8% of their income on LTC insurance 
premiums in 2000, - down from 6 percent of their income in 1995.  In 2000, 54 percent of 
purchasers spent 1 to 3 percent of their income to buy LTC insurance, and 20 percent of 
those used 4 to 5 percent of their income for LTC insurance. An average of 52 percent of 
purchasers reported that they liquidated their savings to support paying for LTC 
insurance. At age 55 to 64, 41 percent of purchasers liquidate assets to help pay LTC 
insurance, but 61 percent of those did so among policyholders ages 70 to 74. The 
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liquidation rate decreases with the level of income as we can expect. Nearly 67 percent of 
purchasers with incomes of less than $25,000 liquidate assets to pay for LTC insurance, 
while only 40 percent of those with incomes greater than $50,000 did (HIAA, 2000). On 
top of that, most of older adults, 99 percent of purchasers, indicate that they purchased 
their LTC insurance without any financial assistance from their children. In this study the 
threshold ratio, therefore, is set as 5 percent of income (or 0.05). Then, to allow for 
sensitivity analysis, we also examine two alternative income thresholds: 3 percent and 7 
percent.  
 
4.4. METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE THIRD DEFINITION 
This definition of affordability is based on a behavioral model of whether or not 
individuals purchase LTC insurance. Loosely speaking, an individual can afford LTC 
insurance if there are other individuals with circumstances similar to their own who are 
purchasing LTC insurance. To apply the definition, I first estimate a probit regression 
model for whether an individual actually purchases LTC insurance. I then use the 
estimated model to identify individuals who can afford coverage, even if they are 
choosing not to buy it.  
 The model presumes there are two possible outcomes, purchasing and not-
purchasing private LTC insurance. Suppose ℎ𝑖 = 1 if subject 𝑖(𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑁) is assigned 
to purchasing LTC insurance, and ℎ𝑖 = 0 if subject 𝑖 is assigned to not purchasing LTC 
insurance. Let 𝑥𝑖  be a vector of observed measurements or covariates. The model to be 
estimated can be written: 
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𝑃𝑟 ℎ1 = 1 𝑋1 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽 +  𝜀𝑖 > 0), 
where εi is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. 
  Upon estimating the model I then match non-purchasers with purchasers on the 
basis of their background measurements (or covariates). Matched subjects have the 
property that the distribution of observed covariates for the purchasing and non-
purchasing groups is almost the same. There is, however, an issue regarding determining 
how to match subjects within some bands of tolerance.  
Stratification (or subclassification) is commonly used technique to control for 
systematic differences between purchasing and non-purchasing groups. This technique 
sorts subjects out by strata determined by observed background characteristics. Once the 
strata are defined, in the same stratum purchasers and non-purchasers are compared 
directly. If, however, the number of covariates increases, then directly comparing 
purchasing and non-purchasing groups is not straightforward. Cochran and Chambers 
(1965) indicates that as the number of covariates increases, the number of strata grows 
exponentially.  
This problem, however, is cleared up by matching on the basis of propensity scores. 
Because the propensity score is a scalar summary of all the observed background 
covariates, stratification on it can balance the distributions of the covariates in the 
purchasing and non-purchasing groups without the exponential increase in number of 
strata (D‟agostino, 1998). We can simply determine strata, using the propensity score, 
which is estimated by logistic regression. Then the researcher has to decide whether the 
stratum boundaries should be based on the vales of the propensity score for both groups 
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combined or in the purchasing and non-purchasing groups alone (D‟agostino, 1998). In 
general, the quintiles of the estimated propensity score from the combined group are 
employed to determine the cut-offs for the different strata.  
I use propensity scores to match non-purchasers to purchasers on the basis of their 
characteristics.  
 
A. Estimating the propensity score  
In a binary response model, a response possibility is: 
𝑝 𝒙 ≡  𝑃 𝑦 = 1 𝒙 =  𝑃 𝑦 = 1 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3  ⋯𝑥𝐿  
 Suppose there are an observed binary variable 𝑦 and an unobserved (or latent) variable 
𝑦∗  between −∞ and ∞. The latent 𝑦∗  is assumed to be a linearly structured model as 
follows: 
𝑦∗ = 𝒙𝜷 +  𝜀,             𝑦 = 1[𝑦∗ > 0] , 
where 𝜀 is independent of 𝒙 and symmetric about zero.  
Binary response model (BRM) is: 
𝑃 𝑦 = 1 𝒙 = 𝐺 𝒙𝜷 ≡ 𝑝(𝒙),  (3) 
where 𝒙 is 1 × 𝐿 and 𝜷 is 𝐿 × 1. 0 < 𝐺 𝒗 < 1 for all 𝜀 ∈ 𝓡. 𝐺 𝒗  is an index model 
since  𝑝(𝒙) is a function of 𝒙 only through the index 𝒙𝜷 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯+  𝛽𝐿𝑥𝐿 . 
The probit model employed in this study is the special case of (3) with  
𝐺 𝒗  ≡  𝚽(𝒗) ≡   ∅ 𝑡 𝑑𝑡  
𝒗
−∞
 
where ∅ 𝑡  is the standard normal density,  
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∅ 𝑣 =  
1
 2𝜋
exp −
𝑣2
2
 , 
and therefore Φ(.) is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution, that is: 
𝚽 𝒗 =     
𝒗
−∞
1
 2𝜋
exp −
𝑡2
2
 𝑑𝑡 . 
The interpretation of a probit coefficient, 𝜷, is that a one-unit increase in the predictor 
leads to increasing the probit score by 𝜷 standard deviations.  
The propensity score is defined in terms of the observed covariates. The main role of 
the propensity score, therefore, is reducing the dimensions of the conditioning. In 
estimating the propensity score with a probability model, the selection of which 
interaction or higher order term to include depends on the need to condition fully on the 
observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
Table 4 describes the variables used to predict the purchase of LTC insurance. 
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Table 4. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent  
LTCI 1 if has private long-term care insurance; 0 
Explanatory  
Age Age at interview 
Married 1 if married or partnered; 0 divorced, widowed or never married 
Race  
White 1 if white; 0 otherwise 
Black 1 if black; 0 otherwise 
Other 1 if other race; 0 otherwise 
Premium Monthly premium of the LTC policy 
Edu Years of education 
Totincm Household total income 
Employment  
WrkFT 1 if work full time; 0 otherwise 
WrkPT 1 if work part-time; 0 otherwise 
Ret 1 if retired; 0 otherwise 
Disabled 1 if disabled; 0 otherwise 
Mcare 1 if eligible for Medicare; 0 otherwise 
Mcaid 1 if eligible for Medicaid; 0 otherwise 
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Emcov 1 if insurance covered by employer; 0 otherwise 
Lifins 1 if having life insurance; 0 otherwise 
Wealth Household wealth 
Residence  
Home 1 if owns home; 0 otherwise 
Rent 1 if rents home; 0 otherwise 
Freerent 1 if rents but free; 0 otherwise 
Othome 1 if other home; 0 otherwise 
Health  
Healthy  
1 if self-reported health is excellent, very good, good, or fair; 0 
otherwise 
ADL 1 if any difficulties on activities of daily living; 0 otherwise 
IADL 
1 if any difficulties on instrumental activities of daily living; 0 
otherwise 
Mobil 
1 if any functional limitations on mobility, Large Muscle, Gross 
Fine Motor Activities; 0 otherwise 
Memrye 1 if ever had memory-related disease; 0 otherwise 
Memryc 1 if have memory-related disease; 0 otherwise 
Child Number of living children 
Bro Number of living brothers 
Sis Number of living sisters 
Prob75 Self-reported probability of living to age 75 
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Prob 85 Self-reported probability of living to age 85 or over 
Sample size: 11,663. 
 
In this study, the dependent variable is binary: if the subject has LTC insurance, then 
the dependent variable, y, is defined as 1; otherwise, 0. To check the sensitivity of the 
findings to how well the model is specified, I use five different models to estimate the 
propensity score. Model 1 is the simplest model that just includes demographics, 
education, income, and employment status. Model 2 adds insurance information variables 
to Model 1, such as eligibility of Medicaid or Medicare, existence of insurance covered 
by employer, and having life insurance. Wealth and residence information are added to 
Model 3 so that their effects of wealth and residence on the probability of purchasing 
LTC insurance can be compared with the first two models. Including these covariates 
follows the recent study by Bernard, Banthin, and Encinosa (2009) that emphasizes the 
importance of wealth (or assets) and residence for the decision to purchase acute-care 
health insurance. Even though the study on LTC insurance is not exactly the same as that 
of acute-care health insurance, including this information is also worth while in LTC 
insurance. Model 4 reflects the health status of subjects without including wealth and 
residence information. The model includes the sources about memory problems as well 
as daily activities. The final model contains all possible information by adding family 
structure and life expectancy.  
To estimate the propensity score, this study employs a “reduced sample” rather than 
the whole sample. This approach avoids a large effect of non-purchasers‟ characteristics 
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on estimating the propensity score. Instead of using all possible non-purchasers, I 
randomly select them so that the size of the sample of non-purchasers is balanced with 
the size of the sample of purchasers, 2,134. Thus, the total size of sample to estimate the 
propensity score model becomes 4,268. 
 
B. Matching Methods  
The essential logic of matching is to find control subjects having backgrounds that are 
similar to those of treated subjects. The important role of matching is to balance the 
distributions of all observed pre-treatment characteristics in the treated and control 
groups, and, therefore, to fulfill independence between potential outcomes and 
assignment into treatment, resulting in an unbiased estimate.  
The use of matching can be found in diverse fields of study. It fits all cases that we 
have a treatment (or participation), so that we have both a group of treated subjects and a 
group of non-treated subjects. The character of treatment may be very diverse, such as the 
effect of online banking on the profitability of customers (Hitt and Frei, 2002), the effect 
on the percentage bid-ask spread of Canadian firms being interlisted on an US-Exchange 
(Davies and Kim, 2009), the effect of subsidies on the innovation activities of firms in 
Germany (Hujer and Radic, 2005), the effect of elite college attendance on career 
outcomes (Brand and Halaby, 2003), the effect of a migration decision on the wage 
growth of young men (Ham, Li, and Reagan, 2003), the effect of union membership on 
wages of employees (Bryson, 2002), and the impact of preschool programs on cognitive, 
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psycho-social and anthroprometric outcomes of children (Behrman, Cheng, and Todd, 
2004).  
Matching is a method used to select non-purchasers who are „matched‟ with the 
purchasers on background covariates that the investigator believes need to be controlled. 
Although the idea of finding matches seems straightforward, it is often difficult to find 
control subjects who are similar (that is, can be matched) with treated subjects on all 
important covariates, even when there are only a few background covariates of interest. 
As mentioned above, conditioning on all observed covariates is restricted in case of a 
high dimensional vector. In this case, it is impossible to match accurately in practice 
because an increase in the number of variables raises the number of matching 
exponentially. Matching with the propensity score, however, solves this problem by 
allowing an investigator to match on a single scalar variable and control for many 
background covariates simultaneously. Once the propensity scores are estimated and the 
purchasers are randomly ordered, all non-purchasers are selected by the following two 
different matching methods: nearest neighbor matching and caliper matching. 
 
Nearest Neighbor matching 
Let‟s first look at nearest neighbor (NN) matching that is the most popular matching 
method. Let 𝑉0  and 𝑉1 denote the set of covariates for non-purchases and purchasers 
respectively. Define a neighborhood 𝐶 𝑃𝑖  for every purchaser i. Denote as neighbors for 
i those non-purchasers 𝑗 ∈ 𝑉0 for whom 𝑃𝑗  ∈  𝐶  𝑃𝑖 . Non-purchasers matched to i are in 
the set 𝐾𝑖 , where 𝐾𝑖 =   𝑗 ∈ 𝑉0 𝑃𝑗 ∈  𝐶  𝑃𝑖  . Nearest neighbor matching sets as follows: 
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𝐶 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑖 −  𝑃𝑗 ,     𝑗 ∈ 𝑉0,   
where  .   is a norm. The non-purchaser, having the propensity score of 𝑃𝑗  that is the 
nearest to 𝑃𝑖 , is chosen as a match.  
There are two ways to use this method: (1) reusing 𝑃𝑖  for other matches (with 
replacement), and (2) not reusing it (without replacement). In the case of “with 
replacement,” a non-purchaser can be used more than once as a match, while in the other 
case it is matched only once. Traditionally, the second method is common, and also used 
in this study.  
 
Caliper matching 
There might be the risk of bad matches if the nearest neighbor is far. This issue can be 
solved by imposing a tolerance level on a maximum distance  𝑃𝑖 −  𝑃𝑗  allowed. This 
method is known as caliper matching (Cochrane and Rubin, 1973). A match for subject  
is selected only if 
 𝑃𝑖 −  𝑃𝑗 <  𝛿, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑉0, 
 
where  𝛿  is a predefined level of tolerance. As Smith and Todd (2005) point out, a 
drawback of caliper matching is that it is hard to find a priori what choice of the 
tolerance level is reasonable. 
 This study applies a variant of caliper matching, called, radius matching (Dehejia 
and Wahba, 2002). It uses all non-purchasers within the caliper as well as the nearest 
neighbors. This method makes it possible to use as many non-purchasers as available 
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within the caliper and, therefore, to allow for usage of extra subjects when good matches 
are available (Caliendo, 2006). 
 
C. Replicating Bundorf and Pauly’s method 
The behavioral definition is evaluated with another method. Bundorf and Pauly argue 
that, in theory, one way to examine affordability is to set the threshold based on the 
preferences of the median person. In the empirical implementation, however, they switch 
the definition from the median to the predicted probability, that is, 0.5. Since they cannot 
identify the person with the median preferences, they approximate the median person 
with the predicted probability of purchasing health insurance. In addition, they vary the 
threshold probability form 0.5 to 0.8 for sensitivity analysis. In this study, I set the 
threshold probability at 0.5, and then see how many older Americans have the propensity 
score that is greater than or equal to 0.5. Also, for sensitivity analysis, I vary the threshold 
from 0.5 to 0.7. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
In 2004, the incomes of the elderly are heavily influenced by ages. Table 5.5 
demonstrates that in their 50s, 41.2 percent of households earn between $5,000 and 
$49,000. However, only about 63 and 80 percent of households continue to belong to the 
same range of income in their 60s and 70s, respectively. That is, although in their 50s 
over half older adults earn more than $50,000, only 34.6 percent and 19.4 percent earn 
the same level of income in their 60s and 70s, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Household Income by Age 
Age  Income Less than 
$5,000 
$5,000-
$24,999 
$25,000-
$49,999 
$50,000-
$99,999 
$100,000            
or more 
51-60 4.7% 18.8% 22.4% 30.7% 23.4% 
61-70 2.7 33.1 29.7 21.9 12.7 
71-80 0.9 48.2 31.6 14.0 5.4 
81-90 2.5 61.3 25.4 8.6 2.2 
90 or over 4.6 71.8 16.5 5.6 1.5 
Source: RAND HRS. 
Sample size: 12,558. 
 
Table 6 represents characteristics of the sample used in this study. The average age of 
purchasers, 68.40, is higher than those of non-purchasers, 67.72. Married couples and 
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relatively higher educated persons purchase LTC insurance. Purchasers have much higher 
total income and total assets. On the other hand, purchasers have lower number of 
children and siblings. So if they have family members on whom they are able to rely 
when they need LTC, then they tend not to buy LTC insurance. If they are covered by 
Medicaid, then they are not willing to have LTC insurance. 
 
 5.2. FIRST DEFINITION 
Table 7 shows the percentage of households that can afford private LTC insurance 
under the first definition. Using the poverty level as a gauge for “other spending” after 
buying LTC insurance, I find that the least-generous policy (“Policy 1”) is unaffordable 
for about 25 percent of households in the whole data set. Even 20 percent of the youngest 
age group, people in their 50s, cannot afford Policy 1. When the spending threshold is 
increased to three and four times the poverty thresholds, the affordability is far lower than 
that of the poverty threshold. With the three times the poverty level, about 65 percent of 
households in the whole data set cannot afford LTC insurance. We see even higher 
unaffordability, 75 percent, when using four times poverty level.  
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Table 6. Characteristics of sample 
Variable LTCI purchasers LTCI non-purchasers 
Sample size 2422 16805 
Age 68.40 (9.93) 67.72 (10.75) 
Married 0.71 (0.45) 0.63 (0.48) 
Race 1.13 (0.40) 1.25 (0.54) 
Education 13.60 (2.85) 12.10 (3.34) 
Year retired 1992.49 (8.80) 1991.94 (9.30) 
Total household 
income 
80739.86 (125243.45) 54527.48 (93010.10) 
Total Assets 
(incl. 2
nd
 home) 
681617.89 (1350750.50) 400429.05 (1495095.12) 
Pension & Annuity 7760.08 (22140.19) 4500.02 (35660.88) 
No. of household 
member 
2.04 (0.85) 2.21 (1.17) 
No. of living 
children 
3.17 (1.95) 3.41 (2.12) 
No. of living sisters 1.18 (1.32) 1.44 (1.53) 
No. of living 
brothers 
1.05 (1.27) 1.25 (1.42) 
Prob. to live 75 71.49 (24.91) 63.97 (29.13) 
Prob. to live 80+ 52.78 (30.80) 48.47 (32.59) 
Life insurance (Y/N) 0.76 (0.43) 0.73 (0.89) 
Covered by 0.03 (0.16) 0.10 (0.30) 
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Medicaid (Y/N) 
Covered by 
Medicare (Y/N) 
0.63 (0.48) 0.60 (0.49) 
Work (retire=0; not 
work =1; work=2) 
0.66 (0.89) 0.73 (0.89) 
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
 
We know that age at first purchase for LTC insurance is critical. The older the 
purchaser, the far more expensive is the premium. Age, therefore, is a major factor in the 
percentage of household that can afford private LTC insurance. With three times the 
poverty threshold, the least-generous LTC insurance policy is affordable for 50.9 percent 
of households in their 50s. With the same policy, however, in their 60s, only 39 percent 
of them can afford LTC insurance. The same thing can be seen in the case of four times 
the poverty level. While 39 percent of household can afford the least-generous policy in 
their 50s, only 27.9 percent and 16.8 percent of households have sufficient income to buy 
the same policy in their 60s and 70s, respectively. 
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Table 7. The Percentage Who Can Afford Policy by Age and First Definition of 
Affordability  
 AGE 
LTCI Policies 
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
Poverty level      
 
 
51-60 80.6% 80.4% 79.1% 77.0% 
61-70 78.8 77.9 75.7 67.6 
71-80 76.1 74.0 69.5 50.6 
Total 75.7 73.8 70.4 58.2 
2 times 
poverty level 
     
 51-60 64.5 64.3 63.3 60.8 
 61-70 56.4 55.5 53.0 46.8 
 71-80 45.5 43.8 40.6 39.2 
 Total 51.3 50.0 47.8 40.1 
3 times 
poverty level 
     
 51-60 50.9 50.7 49.9 47.7 
 61-70 39.0 38.6 37.0 32.5 
 71-80 26.3 25.6 23.9 17.8 
 Total 35.3 34.7 33.1 28.4 
      
48 
 
 
4 times 
poverty level 
 51-60 39.0 39.0 38.4 36.1 
 61-70 27.9 27.5 26.1 23.4 
 71-80 16.8 16.2 15.4 11.4 
 Total 25.0 24.6 23.6 20.5 
Source: Author‟s calculation based on RAND HRS. 
Sample size: 12,558. 
  
 A much lower percentage of households can afford private LTC insurance when 
considering the most-generous policy. With the least-generous policy, we see that a 
relatively higher percentage of households can afford private LTC insurance. That is, if 
using the most-generous policy at the same age many more households may not be able 
to purchase private LTC insurance with their income. With the three times threshold, 
households that don‟t have sufficient income to purchase the most-generous policy are 
almost 72 percent in total; even in their 50s about 53 percent of households cannot afford 
it. In the case of the four times threshold, nearly 80 percent of households are classified 
as unafforders in total. Even the youngest group reports 36 percent of affordability. 
 
5.3. SECOND DEFINITION 
Table 8 shows the simulation results from the analysis of the ratio definition using the 
standard five income affordability threshold, and also two alternative thresholds of three 
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and seven percent. The premium-income ratio definition shows slightly different results 
from those of the first definition.  
First, setting the affordability threshold ratio at 0.05, I find about 53 percent of 
households can afford the least-generous LTC insurance policy. In addition, for people in 
their 50s, Policy 1 is affordable for almost 93 percent of elderly households. However, 
only 26 percent of them can bear the costs of the most-generous policy (“Policy 4”). The 
policy effect is much larger than that of the first definition. When the households buy 
Policy 3 or Policy 4, there is a sharp decline in affordability compared to Policy 1 or 
Policy 2. For persons in their 70s, only 1.1 percent are able to afford Policy 4, but nearly 
26 percent can afford Policy 1.  
By decreasing the threshold ratio to three percent, we can see a little lower 
affordability for older households. Although 85 percent of households can afford Policy 1 
in their 50s, only 10.5 percent are able to bear spending on the same policy in their 70s. 
As with the 5 percent threshold, changing a policy has a large effect on affordability. At 
the same age group, for example, people in their 60s, 47.8 percent can afford Policy 1, 
but only 11.5 percent and 2.4 percent are able to afford Policy 3 and Policy 4, 
respectively. 
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Table 8. The Percentage Who Can Afford Policy by Age and Second Definition of 
Affordability 
 AGE 
LTCI Policies 
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
Less than 3% 
of income 
 
51-60 85.0% 77.6% 42.4% 12.5% 
61-70 47.8 33.8 11.5 2.4 
71-80 10.5 5.3 1.9 0.3 
Total 40.0 32.0 14.9 4.0 
 51-60 92.8 87.0 64.0 25.9 
Less than 5% 
of income 
61-70 69.5 55.4 25.2 5.4 
 71-80 25.9 15.1 5.0 1.1 
 Total 53.3 44.3 25.7 8.6 
 51-60 95.3 92.1 75.0 39.4 
Less than 7% 
of income 
61-70 81.9 69.3 38.9 10.2 
 71-80 40.7 26.8 10.6 1.8 
 Total 62.2 53.3 34.5 13.7 
Source: Author‟s calculation based on RAND HRS. 
Sample size: 12,558. 
 
The seven percent threshold shows a higher percentage of affordability compared to 
two other thresholds. However, effects from different ages and policies are still crucial 
factors on affordability.  
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 In conclusion, age is an important factor for affordability under the second 
definition, ration definition. In addition to the age effect, the ratio definition has the large 
policy effect on affordability. 
 
5.4. THIRD DEFINITION 
To compute propensity scores, five different models are tested on LTC insurance by a 
probit model. Tables B.1 through B.4 represent the results of them. Age has a positive 
effect on LTC insurance purchasing, too. Likewise, purchasers of life insurance tend to 
buy LTC insurance. Having more than $75,000 in wealth has a positive effect on 
purchasing private LTC insurance. As expected, if individuals benefit from Medicaid, 
then they tend not to purchase private LTC insurance. African-Americans and other 
minorities reported a lower probability of purchasing private LTC insurance, compared to 
a white group.  
Figures A.1 through A.20 present histograms of the distributions of estimated 
propensity scores for each sample of LTC insurance purchasers and non-purchasers with 
five models having four different policies. Although the distribution of the propensity 
score between LTC insurance purchasers and non-purchasers is not exactly separated and 
there are some overlaps, in general, purchasers‟ bins belonging to higher propensity 
scores are taller than those of non-purchasers. In other words, the propensity scores of 
purchasers are skewed toward relatively higher propensity scores, but those of non-
purchasers are inclined to the lower level of propensity scores, as would be expected. 
With Model 1 that has only demographics, income, and employment status as 
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explanatory variables, 68.4 percent of purchasers who have the cheapest premium have 
propensity scores that are more than 0.5, while only 36.2 percent of non-purchasers do. 
Unlike the expectation, different premiums have almost no effect on the propensity score. 
Although the most generous premium is employed in the model, the distributions of 
propensity scores present the similar shape in Model 1. While 68.3 percent of purchasers 
have the propensity score that is larger than 0.5, only 36.5 percent of non-purchasers have 
the probability of 0.5. Like the results from the normative definitions, therefore, the 
difference of premium does not have as a great effect as expected.  
 Next, we focus on the propensity scores when the model changes. The premium is 
fixed, but the model varies. For example, consider Policy 1 that is the least generous with 
five different models, and examine the difference in the propensity scores. Varying 
premiums with the same model does not produce very different results, but changing 
models with the same premium shows differences among models. For Model 2 having 
Policy 1, 68.6 percent and 35.6 percent pertain into the propensity score level of 0.5 or 
higher, purchasers and non-purchasers respectively. With Model 4 applying the cheapest 
premium, 77.7 percent of purchasers show that the propensity score is higher than 0.5, 
whereas 44.4 percent of non-purchasers belong to that level of the propensity scores.  
Based on the estimated propensity scores, two matching methods are implemented, 
radius matching and nearest available matching. First, with radius matching, propensity 
scores are matched by three different calipers, 0.00003, 0.0005, and 0.0001. In the case of 
the least generous LTC insurance policy, applying the tightest caliper, 0.00003, Table 9 
shows that 20.4 percent of the youngest people can afford LTC insurance in Model 1. At 
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the same age group with the Model 1, 22 percent and 24.6 percent of people have the 
money for LTC insurance with a caliper of 0.0005 and 0.0001, respectively. For the 
oldest group with the tightest caliper in the Model 1, only 17.4 percent can afford LTC 
insurance.   
Next, Model 2 that considers the group that has other insurance, including insurance 
covered by an employer, Medicaid or Medicare eligibility, and having life insurance. In 
the case of Model 2 with the cheapest policy, the result is slightly different: the 
affordability is slightly less than the case of Model 1. Model 2 has more explanatory 
variables to estimate the propensity scores. When using the tightest caliper for the oldest 
age group, only 12.2 percent of the elderly can spare sufficient money for LTC insurance. 
Even with the least expensive premium, if the propensity scores are measured by all 
observed covariates, then only 4.5 percent of older adults in their 50s can afford LTC 
insurance when applied the tightest caliper.  
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Table 9. Radius matching with Policy 1  
 Age 
 Radius  
   
Model 1     
 51-60 20.4% 22.0% 24.6% 
 61-70 21.4 24.3 28.5 
 71-80 17.4 20.3 24.6 
 Total 18.2 20.9 25.5 
Model 2     
 51-60 16.2 19.1 23.0 
 61-70 14.4 17.9 25.4 
 71-80 12.2 14.2 20.6 
 Total 13.0 15.9 21.9 
Model 3     
 51-60 15.0 18.3 25.7 
 61-70 12.0 16.2 25.1 
 71-80 8.2 12.4 22.4 
 Total 10.6 14.4 23.3 
Model 4     
 51-60 7.2 10.6 17.5 
 61-70 5.6 8.9 16.7 
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 71-80 6.3 9.4 16.3 
 Total 6.0 9.0 15.8 
Model 5     
 51-60 4.5 7.7 14.7 
 61-70 5.0 8.2 15.3 
 71-80 4.5 7.2 15.5 
 Total 4.5 7.5 14.9 
Sample size:4,288. 
 
  Model 3 contains respondents‟ health status information and life expectancy. It has 
more observed covariates than the two previous models, and shows relatively different 
results. The percentage of people who can afford LTC insurance is relatively dramatically 
reduced. For the youngest group, only 7.2 percent of older adults have enough income 
and wealth to buy LTC insurance when the narrowest caliper is applied. For the case of 
the loosest caliper, the affordability is improved of 17.5 percent for the same age group. 
There is no great difference even when considering people in their 70s: 6.3 percent and 
16.3 percent of them can afford private LTC insurance with the caliper of 0.00003 and 
0.0001, respectively. 
Model 4 has all observed covariates, including information on family structure. In 
general, many older adults think their children or siblings, even relatives, would take care 
of them when needing LTC insurance. Most people who need LTC use unpaid services at 
home from family members and friends. There are people who receive only paid services 
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at home, but those are fewer than 10 percent. In general, relying solely on assistance from 
family members is the most common way to get LTC, although there are people who use 
both paid and unpaid services at home. Therefore, the number of children and siblings 
can be a serious factor in deciding whether to purchase LTC insurance or not. By using 
the narrowest caliper in Model 4 for the youngest group, only 4.5 percent of older adults 
can afford LTC insurance, but with the loosest caliper, 14.7 percent can. In this case, the 
oldest group reveals almost same results as the youngest group.  
There are substantial difference between first two models, Model 1 and Model 2, and 
last two models, Model 3 and Model 4. In contrast, Model 1 and Model 2 do not have 
significant differences. There are also no substantial differences between Model 3 and 
Model 4. 
When using Policy 2 for estimating the propensity score, Table 10, the matching 
results do not vary greatly from those of Policy 1. Rather, the percentage who can afford 
LTC insurance policy is less than those of Policy 1 at almost every model and age group. 
First, in Model 1 with the narrowest caliper, 19.4 percent and 18.2 percent can afford 
LTC insurance for people in their 50s and 70s, respectively. People who are in their 60s 
have the largest percentage of affordability. In the case of Policy 1, the youngest group, 
those in their 50s, is the largest one. In Model 1, 21.3 percent and 29.4 percent of those in 
their 60s can afford LTC insurance with calipers of 0.00003 and 0.0001, respectively. For 
people in their 50s, 19.4 percent can afford with the caliper of 0.00003. 
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Table 10. Radius matching with Policy 2  
 Age 
 Radius  
   
Model 1     
 51-60 19.4% 21.5% 24.8% 
 61-70 21.3 23.5 29.4 
 71-80 18.2 20.9 25.9 
 Total 18.2 20.9 26.2 
Model 2     
 51-60 17.1 18.6 23.5 
 61-70 14.1 18.2 24.9 
 71-80 12.6 16.2 21.4 
 Total 13.2 16.4 22.2 
Model 3     
 51-60 13.3 16.7 26.3 
 61-70 11.8 15.3 24.6 
 71-80 8.6 13.2 23.2 
 Total 10.2 14.1 23.7 
Model 4     
 51-60 6.9 9.6 15.0 
 61-70 4.9 7.7 16.1 
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 71-80 5.9 8.6 15.0 
 Total 5.6 8.4 14.9 
Model 5     
 51-60 4.5 7.3 14.6 
 61-70 4.2 6.1 13.3 
 71-80 4.4 7.3 14.7 
 Total 4.4 7.0 13.9 
Sample size:4,288. 
 
Model 2 with Policy 2 shows similar results as Policy 1. With 17.1 percent and 14.1 
percent affordability with the tightest caliper for people in their 50s and 60s, respectively, 
the youngest group has greater affordability than the older one. The oldest group has an 
even smaller percentage, 12.6 percent with the narrowest caliper. However, although the 
difference is not huge, with the most relaxed caliper the people who are in their 60s 
present the largest percentage of affordability, 24.9 percent, compared with 23.5 percent 
and 21.4 percent for people in their 50s and 70s, respectively.  
Model 3 has the unexpected results that those in their 70s have greater affordability 
than those in their 60s, except for the loosest caliper. However, the youngest age group 
shows the largest affordability in the calipers of 0.00003 and 0.0005. 
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Table 11. Radius matching with Policy 3  
 Age 
 Radius  
   
Model 1     
 51-60 20.8% 22.6% 27.2% 
 61-70 22.6 25.0 30.2 
 71-80 19.7 22.6 26.7 
 Total 20.0 22.6 27.2 
Model 2     
 51-60 17.2 19.9 25.8 
 61-70 14.6 17.4 23.9 
 71-80 13.0 16.4 23.9 
 Total 13.6 16.7 23.0 
Model 3     
 51-60 14.2 17.9 25.0 
 61-70 13.8 17.7 26.5 
 71-80 11.2 14.7 24.3 
 Total 11.9 15.7 24.3 
Model 4     
 51-60 5.6 8.4 13.6 
 61-70 5.9 9.5 16.5 
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 71-80 5.6 7.4 13.8 
 Total 5.5 8.3 14.1 
Model 5     
 51-60 4.5 7.9 15.2 
 61-70 4.4 7.4 14.4 
 71-80 5.1 8.5 15.5 
 Total 4.3 7.4 14.4 
Sample size:4,288. 
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Table 12. Radius matching with Policy 4  
 Age 
 Radius  
   
Model 1     
 51-60 21.0% 23.6% 25.3% 
 61-70 21.2 23.9 30.7 
 71-80 19.2 21.5 25.4 
 Total 19.5 22.2 27.2 
Model 2     
 51-60 16.1 18.8 24.5 
 61-70 15.2 17.0 23.6 
 71-80 12.7 15.9 21.6 
 Total 13.7 16.4 22.6 
Model 3     
 51-60 13.4 15.9 25.3 
 61-70 12.6 16.4 24.8 
 71-80 10.8 14.8 23.5 
 Total 11.0 14.6 23.6 
Model 4     
 51-60 4.4 7.7 13.0 
 61-70 6.3 9.4 16.3 
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 71-80 5.8 8.4 13.9 
 Total 5.5 8.4 14.3 
Model 5     
 51-60 4.4 6.8 14.6 
 61-70 4.7 8.0 15.5 
 71-80 5.5 8.3 14.6 
 Total 4.5 7.4 14.4 
Sample size:4,288. 
 
When using the most generous policy, Table 12, all models provide similar results as 
the three previous premiums. At this point, therefore, I argue that the price of LTC 
insurance is not a significant factor in the decision to purchase. With two narrow calipers 
in Model 1, those in their 50s and 60s show analogous results: with the caliper of 0.00003, 
21.0 percent of the younger age group and 21.2 percent for the other group,  with the 
caliper of 0.0005, 23.6 percent and 23.9 percent, respectively.  
Model 2 presents the same results. Among people in their 50s with the narrowest 
caliper, only 16.1 percent can have sufficient income to buy LTC insurance. 
The results with Model 3 are similar to the results with Model 2. For people inn their 
50s, 13.4 percent and 25.3 percent with the calipers of 0.00003 and 0.0001, respectively, 
are able to afford private LTC insurance.  
Model 4 shows comparable results over all policies. With all policies as the percentage 
of who-can-afford is between four and six percent with the narrowest caliper, it 
represents the lowest percentage.  
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Overall, Model 1 has relatively small number of explanatory variables so that it might 
roughly estimate the propensity score used for matching. It might suggest approximate 
predictions on affordability of LTC insurance. In contrast, Model 2 and Model 3 present 
reasonable results. These two models include variables of wealth and residence, and 
health status, respectively. 
In addition to caliper matching, this study tries another matching method, nearest 
available matching. Actually, this matching method is more common in other literatures 
than the caliper matching method. This method matches the propensity scores of 
purchasers with that of non-purchasers, and then finds the closet subjects. The outcomes 
are relatively constant over all models, compared to the radius matching method. The 
percentages of who-can-afford in all models range from 10 to 20 percent. People who are 
in their 60s show the largest percentage in all models.  
 With Policy 4 in Model 1, 24.4 percent of age 60s can afford LTC insurance, and, 
overall, 22.6 percent of older adults can. As mentioned above, Model 2, 3, and 4 do not 
show very different results from Model 1. The similar results are reported from Model 5: 
17.8 percent and 20.9 percent of the elderly are able to buy LTC insurance in their 50s 
and 60s, respectively. (See Table B.5.) 
Finally, I follow Bundorf and Pauly‟s (2006) behavioral model. They provide the 
concept of threshold probability. They set at 0.5, and vary the threshold probability to do 
sensitivity analysis. So this study also sets the threshold probability at 0.5, and varies it as 
0.6 and 0.7. First when setting the threshold probability as 0.5, with Model 1 36.6 percent 
of older adults, in total, can afford LTC insurance: 18.5 percent in their 50s and 44.3 
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percent in their 60s. When the threshold is raised to 0.7, 7.6 percent of them overall can 
afford private LTC insurance, but only 1.9 percent in their 50s, and 42.9 percent in their 
60s. It shows that quite small numbers of older adults can afford LTC insurance.  
Model 2, which has insurance but not health information, shows analogous results 
with those of Model 1. With P = 0.5, about 36 percent of people can afford LTC 
regardless of their age. When the threshold is raised to 0.7, the affordability is only 7.6 
percent. 
The result of Model 3 is not much different from those of the previous two models. 
Model 3 includes wealth and residence data, but does not have health information. When 
setting the threshold probability at 0.5, the percentage of people who can afford LTC is 
about 40 percent; it is 7.7 percent when P = 0.7. 
Model 4 and Model 5 reveal similar results with other models, but have slightly larger 
percentage of affordability. Model 4 has insurance and health information, but not wealth 
information; Model 5 has all observed covariates. With P = 0.5, LTC insurance is 
affordable for 42.1 percent and 44.3 percent of older adults in Model 4 and Model 5, 
respectively. In contrast, only 8.9 percent and 11.9 percent of them have sufficient 
conditions to purchase LTC insurance. (See Table B.6 through B.9) 
Based on these results I argue that all three definitions present substantially consistent 
results. There are only a small number of older adults who can afford LTC insurance.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study finds that the majority of older Americans cannot afford private LTC 
insurance. Findings from both definitions indicate that lack of affordability can explain 
why few Americans buy private LTC insurance. Using Definition 1 with the poverty 
level as a gauge for “other spending,” the least-generous policy (Policy 1) is found to 
unaffordable for about 25 percent of older households in the U.S. Even in their 50s 20 
percent of them cannot afford Policy 1. The affordability of Policy 1 is far lower with 3 
times poverty level. About 65 percent cannot afford LTC insurance in this case. Even 
among adults in their 50s, about 49 percent cannot afford a policy when using 3 times 
poverty level for non-insurance spending. 
 Using Definition 2 with the 5 percent threshold, 53.3 percent and 8.6 percent of 
older Americans can afford Policy 1 and Policy 4, respectively. Using the 3 percent 
threshold with Policy 1 and Policy 4, 40 percent and 4 percent can afford coverage. For 
the case of the 7 percent, 62.2 percent and 13.7 percent can afford coverage, respectively. 
Using Definition 3 with Policy 4, applying caliper matching to Model 2 shows that 
only 16.1 percent of people at age 50s with the narrowest can have sufficient income to 
buy LTC insurance. With Model 3 the results are similar with those of Model 2. In their 
50s 13.4 percent and 25.3 percent with the calipers of 0.00003 and 0.0001, respectively, 
are able to afford private LTC insurance. However, Model 4 presents relatively different 
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outcome. With the calipers of 0.00003 and 0.0001 in their 50s only 4.4 percent and 13.0 
percent, respectively, are considered as being able to afford. 
An important finding of this study is the role of age. All definitions consistently reveal 
that affordability drops dramatically as age increases. In the first definition, when I 
consider 3 times poverty level with Policy 4, the affordability goes down from 47.7 
percent to 32.5 percent for those aged 50s and 60s, respectively. The second definition 
shows a more rapid decline of affordability. In considering a 5 percent threshold ratio 
with Policy 4, we can see 25.9 percent and 5.4 percent of affordability for those aged 50s 
and 60s, respectively.  
The effect of different policies on affordability varies slightly between definitions. 
Only the second definition shows a large policy effect, while the first definition indicates 
small effects. At the 5 percent threshold ratio for adults in their 60s, 69.5 percent can 
afford Policy 1, but only 5.4 percent of them can afford Policy 4. With the second 
definition, therefore, there is a large policy effect as well for age. In contrast, the first 
definition has relatively small affordability variation due to policy changes. In all age 
groups, the effects of policies are not quite as large.   
By contrasting and comparing results from three definitions, I can draw more general 
conclusions regarding of the role of affordability in explaining non-purchase. This is 
critical point for the study of affordability. Because the level of the bearable cost is 
subjective the concept of affordability is difficult to define. Therefore, there is no 
consensus on the definition of affordability. Regardless of definition, there is a low level 
of affordability of private LTC insurance among older adults. In other words, both 
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definitions consistently show that a minority of older adults can afford private LTC 
insurance. As a result, the lack of affordability is undoubtedly a substantial barrier of the 
uninsured on LTC. To make private LTC insurance supportable for financial resources on 
LTC spending, as the results of this study propose, the fundamentals of unaffordability 
should be resolved so that the private LTC insurance can be the alternative method to 
supply financial supports on LTC spending. 
Unlike other previous studies on the affordability of private LTC insurance that used 
much smaller samples, often from private companies, this study uses nationally 
representative data from the 2004 HRS and the Rand HRS files. The HRS surveys more 
than 22,000 Americans over age 50 every other year, and provides extensive information 
on the utilization of formal LTC services and informal care, as well as demographic 
characteristics, family structure, financial resources, employment, insurance coverage, 
and health and disability. The Rand HRS data contains all waves from HRS by only 
incorporating the core interviews although the HRS contains several auxiliary files. So 
using these two data sets enables generalization of my findings to older adults nationwide 
in the U.S. 
 The findings from this study have implications for policymakers. The findings 
suggest that size of a private market for LTC insurance may be severely limited because 
most older adults cannot afford coverage. A small market throws doubt on the role of 
private insurance in the formation of financial supports to protect the aged against LTC 
expenditures. In other words, there is a possibility that the potential market could remain 
relatively small in terms of its capacity to protect large segments of the elderly against 
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LTC risks. Moreover, private insurance still appears a relatively unattractive investment 
even for many affluent potential purchasers based on the comparison of total expected 
lifetime consumption and insurance costs.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
Figure A. 1. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 1 with Policy 1 
 
Figure A. 2. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 2 with Policy 1 
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Figure A. 3 . Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 3 with Policy 1  
 
 
Figure A. 4 . Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 4 with Policy 1 
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Figure A. 5 . Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 5 with Policy 1  
 
Figure A. 6 . Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 1 with Policy 2  
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Figure A. 7 . Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 2 with Policy 2 
 
Figure A. 8 . Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 3 with Policy 2  
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Figure A. 9 .Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 4 with Policy 2  
 
 
Figure A. 10 . Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 5 with Policy 2  
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Figure A. 11. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 1 with Policy 3 
 
 
Figure A. 12. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 2 with Policy 3  
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Figure A. 13. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 3 with Policy 3  
 
 
Figure A. 14. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 4 with Policy 3  
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
%
Propensity Score
Holders' PS
Non-holders' PS
0.05    0.15    0.25    0.35 0.45    0.55    0.65   0.75    0.85    0.95
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
%
Propensity Score
Holders' PS
Non-holders' PS
0.05    0.15     0.25     0.35 0.45     0.55      0.65     0.75     0.85    
76 
 
 
Figure A. 15. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 5 with Policy 3  
 
 
Figure A. 16. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 1 with Policy 4  
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Figure A. 17. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 2 with Policy 4  
 
Figure A. 18. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 3 with Policy 4  
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Figure A. 19. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 4 with Policy 4  
 
Figure A. 20. Distribution of Propensity Score - Model 5 with Policy 4  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B. 1. Regression results from estimating propensity score 
(Dependent variable: LTC insurance; Policy 1) 
Variable Coefficients     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Age 
0.036*** 
(0.005) 
0.036*** 
(0.006) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.026*** 
(0.009) 
Married 
-0.041 
(0.050) 
-0.050 
(0.051) 
-0.118** 
(0.055) 
-0.046 
(0.055) 
-0.101* 
(0.061) 
Race
1 
     
Black 
-0.245*** 
(0.067) 
-0.260*** 
(0.069) 
-0.135* 
(0.073) 
-0.265*** 
(0.077) 
-0.139* 
(0.084) 
Other 
-0.392*** 
(0.124) 
-0.367*** 
(0.127) 
-0.295** 
(0.131) 
-0.384*** 
(0.138) 
-0.320** 
(0.145) 
Premium 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Premium/Income 
-0.084 
(0.106) 
-0.091 
(0.120) 
-0.138 
(0.141) 
-0.075 
(0.105) 
-0.117 
(0.121) 
Edu 
0.086*** 
(0.008) 
0.080*** 
(0.008) 
0.063*** 
(0.009) 
0.071*** 
(0.009) 
0.050*** 
(0.010) 
Total income
2 
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[$5,000, $25,000] 
-0.213 
(0.191) 
-0.312 
(0.195) 
-0.577*** 
(0.217) 
-0.363* 
(0.220) 
-0.550** 
(0.243) 
[$25,000, $50,000] 
0.204 
(0.192) 
0.057 
(0.197) 
-0.282 
(0.219) 
-0.024 
(0.221) 
-0.296 
(0.245) 
[$50,000, $100,000] 
0.416** 
(0.194) 
0.247 
(0.199) 
-0.162 
(0.222) 
0.149 
(0.224) 
-0.193 
(0.247) 
$100,000 < 
0.543*** 
(0.198) 
0.381* 
(0.203) 
-0.080 
(0.226) 
0.259 
(0.227) 
-0.126 
(0.251) 
Employment
3 
     
WrkFT 
-0.028 
(0.084) 
-0.165* 
(0.088) 
-0.108 
(0.095) 
-0.167* 
(0.095) 
-0.102 
(0.103) 
WrkPT 
-0.051 
(0.118) 
-0.107 
(0.120) 
-0.172 
(0.128) 
-0.137 
(0.128) 
-0.197 
(0.137) 
Ret 
0.180** 
(0.072) 
0.122* 
(0.074) 
0.116 
(0.079) 
0.136* 
(0.080) 
0.139 
(0.086) 
Disabled 
-0.120 
(0.178) 
-0.032 
(0.184) 
0.059 
(0.198) 
0.079 
(0.218) 
0.101 
(0.234) 
Mcare  
0.015 
(0.072) 
-0.003 
(0.078) 
0.035 
(0.088) 
-0.015 
(0.096) 
Mcaid  
-0.353*** 
(0.102) 
-0.266** 
(0.116) 
-0.282** 
(0.123) 
-0.172 
(0.137) 
Emcov   0.116** 0.091* 0.151*** 0.123** 
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(0.048) (0.051) (0.052) (0.055) 
Lifins  
0.333*** 
(0.074) 
0.344*** 
(0.050) 
0.304*** 
(0.051) 
0.319*** 
(0.055) 
Wealth
4 
     
[$5,000, $25,000]   
0.070 
(0.141) 
 
0.261 
(0.163) 
[$25,000, $75,000]   
0.115 
(0.132) 
 
0.171 
(0.152) 
[$75,000, $200,000]   
0.273** 
(0.127) 
 
0.366** 
(0.147) 
$200,000 <   
0.636*** 
(0.128) 
 
0.721*** 
(0.149) 
Residence
5 
     
Rent   
-0.033 
(0.091) 
 
-0.071 
(0.100) 
Freerent   
-0.260 
(0.187) 
 
-0.426* 
(0.218) 
Othome   
0.096 
(0.162) 
 
0.098 
(0.190) 
Health      
Healthy     
0.177 
(0.112) 
0.125 
(0.122) 
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ADL    
-0.045 
(0.048) 
-0.057 
(0.053) 
IADL    
-0.177* 
(0.091) 
-0.195* 
(0.100) 
Mobil    
-0.030 
(0.022) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
Memrye    
0.287 
(0.476) 
0.467 
(0.512) 
Memryc    
-0.059 
(0.521) 
-0.249 
(0.573) 
Child     
-0.009 
(0.012) 
Bro      
-0.023 
(0.020) 
Sis      
0.005 
(0.019) 
Prob75    
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Prob 85    
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Intercept 
-3.554*** 
(0.359) 
-3.557*** 
(0.430) 
-3.144*** 
(0.473) 
-3.511*** 
(0.554) 
-2.875*** 
(0.618) 
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Sample size: 4,267. 
Note: 
1: The reference group is white. 
2: The reference group is total income < $5,000. 
3: The reference group is not in the labor force. 
4: The reference group is total wealth < $5,000. 
5: The reference group is home owners. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table B. 2. Regression results from estimating propensity score 
(Dependent variable: LTC insurance; Policy 2) 
Variable Coefficients     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Age 
0.036*** 
(0.005) 
0.036*** 
(0.006) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.026*** 
(0.009) 
Married 
-0.041 
(0.050) 
-0.050 
(0.051) 
-0.118** 
(0.055) 
-0.046 
(0.055) 
-0.101* 
(0.061) 
Race
1 
     
Black 
-0.245*** 
(0.067) 
-0.260*** 
(0.069) 
-0.135* 
(0.073) 
-0.265*** 
(0.077) 
-0.139* 
(0.084) 
Other 
-0.392*** 
(0.124) 
-0.367*** 
(0.127) 
-0.295** 
(0.131) 
-0.384*** 
(0.138) 
-0.320** 
(0.145) 
Premium 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Premium/Income 
-0.054 
(0.070) 
-0.058 
(0.079) 
-0.091 
(0.095) 
-0.048 
(0.070) 
-0.077 
(0.081) 
Edu 
0.086*** 
(0.008) 
0.080*** 
(0.008) 
0.063*** 
(0.009) 
0.071*** 
(0.009) 
0.050*** 
(0.010) 
Total income
2 
     
[$5,000, $25,000] -0.211 -0.310 -0.574*** -0.361 -0.548** 
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(0.191) (0.195) (0.217) (0.220) (0.243) 
[$25,000, $50,000] 
0.206 
(0.192) 
0.059 
(0.197) 
-0.280 
(0.219) 
-0.022 
(0.221) 
-0.293 
(0.244) 
[$50,000, $100,000] 
0.418** 
(0.194) 
0.249 
(0.199) 
-0.160 
(0.221) 
0.151 
(0.223) 
-0.191 
(0.247) 
$100,000 < 
0.545** 
(0.198) 
0.384* 
(0.203) 
-0.077 
(0.225) 
0.261 
(0.227) 
-0.123 
(0.251) 
Employment
3 
     
WrkFT 
-0.028 
(0.084) 
-0.165* 
(0.088) 
-0.108 
(0.095) 
-0.167* 
(0.095) 
-0.102 
(0.103) 
WrkPT 
-0.050 
(0.118) 
-0.107 
(0.120) 
-0.172 
(0.128) 
-0.137 
(0.128) 
-0.197 
(0.137) 
Ret 
0.180** 
(0.072) 
0.122** 
(0.074) 
0.116 
(0.079) 
0.136* 
(0.080) 
0.139 
(0.086) 
Disabled 
-0.120 
(0.178) 
-0.031 
(0.184) 
0.059 
(0.198) 
0.080 
(0.218) 
0.102 
(0.234) 
Mcare  
0.014 
(0.072) 
-0.004 
(0.078) 
0.034 
(0.088) 
-0.015 
(0.096) 
Mcaid  
-0.353*** 
(0.102) 
-0.266** 
(0.116) 
-0.282** 
(0.123) 
-0.172 
(0.137) 
Emcov   
0.116** 
(0.048) 
0.091* 
(0.051) 
0.151*** 
(0.052) 
0.123** 
(0.055) 
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Lifins  
0.333*** 
(0.047) 
0.344*** 
(0.050) 
0.304*** 
(0.051) 
0.319*** 
(0.055) 
Wealth
4 
     
[$5,000, $25,000]   
0.069 
(0.141) 
 
0.260 
(0.163) 
[$25,000, $75,000]   
0.115 
(0.132) 
 
0.171 
(0.152) 
[$75,000, $200,000]   
0.272** 
(0.127) 
 
0.366** 
(0.147) 
$200,000 <   
0.635*** 
(0.128) 
 
0.720*** 
(0.149) 
Residence
5 
     
Rent   
-0.033 
(0.091) 
 
-0.071 
(0.100) 
Freerent   
-0.260 
(0.187) 
 
-0.426* 
(0.218) 
Othome   
0.095 
(0.162) 
 
0.098 
(0.190) 
Health      
Healthy     
0.177 
(0.112) 
0.125 
(0.122) 
ADL    -0.045 -0.057 
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(0.048) (0.053) 
IADL    
-0.177* 
(0.091) 
-0.195* 
(0.100) 
Mobil    
-0.030 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.024) 
Memrye    
0.288 
(0.476) 
0.467 
(0.512) 
Memryc    
-0.059 
(0.521) 
-0.249 
(0.573) 
Child     
-0.009 
(0.012) 
Bro      
-0.023 
(0.020) 
Sis      
0.005 
(0.019) 
Prob75    
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Prob 85    
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Intercept 
-3.544*** 
(0.357) 
-3.550*** 
(0.428) 
-3.139*** 
(0.471) 
-3.513*** 
(0.552) 
-2.879*** 
(0.616) 
Sample size: 4,267. 
Note: 
1: The reference group is white. 
88 
 
 
2: The reference group is total income < $5,000. 
3: The reference group is not in the labor force. 
4: The reference group is total wealth < $5,000. 
5: The reference group is home owners. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table B. 3. Regression results from estimating propensity score 
(Dependent variable: LTC insurance; Policy 3) 
Variable Coefficients     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Age 
0.036*** 
(0.005) 
0.036*** 
(0.006) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.026*** 
(0.010) 
Married 
-0.039 
(0.050) 
-0.048 
(0.051) 
-0.117** 
(0.055) 
-0.045 
(0.055) 
-0.100 
(0.061) 
Race
1 
     
Black 
-0.245*** 
(0.067) 
-0.260*** 
(0.069) 
-0.135* 
(0.073) 
-0.265*** 
(0.077) 
-0.139* 
(0.084) 
Other 
-0.392*** 
(0.124) 
-0.368*** 
(0.127) 
-0.296** 
(0.131) 
-0.384*** 
(0.138) 
-0.320** 
(0.145) 
Premium 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Premium/Income 
-0.017 
(0.025) 
-0.017 
(0.027) 
-0.029 
(0.032) 
-0.015 
(0.025) 
-0.026 
(0.029) 
Edu 
0.086*** 
(0.008) 
0.080*** 
(0.008) 
0.063*** 
(0.009) 
0.071*** 
(0.009) 
0.050*** 
(0.010) 
Total income
2 
     
[$5,000, $25,000] -0.201 -0.297 -0.558*** -0.350 -0.532** 
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(0.190) (0.193) (0.215) (0.219) (0.241) 
[$25,000, $50,000] 
0.217 
(0.191) 
0.073 
(0.195) 
-0.263 
(0.217) 
-0.011 
(0.220) 
-0.277 
(0.242) 
[$50,000, $100,000] 
0.429** 
(0.193) 
0.262 
(0.198) 
-0.143 
(0.220) 
0.162 
(0.222) 
-0.176 
(0.245) 
$100,000 < 
0.555*** 
(0.197) 
0.397** 
(0.201) 
-0.061 
(0.224) 
0.272 
(0.226) 
-0.108 
(0.249) 
Employment
3 
     
WrkFT 
-0.030 
(0.084) 
-0.166* 
(0.088) 
-0.109 
(0.095) 
-0.167* 
(0.095) 
-0.102 
(0.103) 
WrkPT 
-0.051 
(0.118) 
-0.107 
(0.120) 
-0.172 
(0.128) 
-0.137 
(0.128) 
-0.198 
(0.137) 
Ret 
0.181** 
(0.072) 
0.122* 
(0.074) 
0.116 
(0.079) 
0.136* 
(0.080) 
0.139 
(0.086) 
Disabled 
-0.120 
(0.178) 
-0.034 
(0.184) 
0.056 
(0.198) 
0.079 
(0.218) 
0.101 
(0.234) 
Mcare  
0.020 
(0.072) 
0.001 
(0.078) 
0.035 
(0.088) 
-0.014 
(0.096) 
Mcaid  
-0.351*** 
(0.102) 
-0.264** 
(0.115) 
-0.281** 
(0.123) 
-0.171 
(0.137) 
Emcov   
0.117** 
(0.048) 
0.092* 
(0.051) 
0.151*** 
(0.052) 
0.124** 
(0.055) 
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Lifins  
0.333*** 
(0.047) 
0.344*** 
(0.050) 
0.304*** 
(0.051) 
0.319*** 
(0.055) 
Wealth
4 
     
[$5,000, $25,000]   
0.067 
(0.141) 
 
0.258 
(0.163) 
[$25,000, $75,000]   
0.115 
(0.132) 
 
0.171 
(0.152) 
[$75,000, $200,000]   
0.272** 
(0.127) 
 
0.365** 
(0.147) 
$200,000 <   
0.635*** 
(0.128) 
 
0.720*** 
(0.149) 
Residence
5 
     
Rent   
-0.034 
(0.091) 
 
-0.071 
(0.100) 
Freerent   
-0.260 
(0.187) 
 
-0.425* 
(0.218) 
Othome   
0.090 
(0.162) 
 
0.093 
(0.190) 
Health      
Healthy     
0.177 
(0.112) 
0.125 
(0.122) 
ADL    -0.046 -0.058 
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(0.048) (0.053) 
IADL    
-0.178* 
(0.091) 
-0.196** 
(0.100) 
Mobil    
-0.030 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.024) 
Memrye    
0.286 
(0.476) 
0.466 
(0.512) 
Memryc    
-0.058 
(0.521) 
-0.248 
(0.573) 
Child     
-0.009 
(0.012) 
Bro      
-0.024 
(0.020) 
Sis      
0.005 
(0.019) 
Prob75    
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Prob 85    
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Intercept 
-3.525*** 
(0.355) 
-3.516*** 
(0.423) 
-3.114*** 
(0.467) 
-3.515*** 
(0.558) 
-2.877*** 
(0.622) 
Sample size: 4,267. 
Note: 
1: The reference group is white. 
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2: The reference group is total income < $5,000. 
3: The reference group is not in the labor force. 
4: The reference group is total wealth < $5,000. 
5: The reference group is home owners. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table B. 4. Regression results from estimating propensity score 
(Dependent variable: LTC insurance; Policy 4) 
Variable Coefficients     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Age 
0.036*** 
(0.005) 
0.036*** 
(0.006) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.026** 
(0.010) 
Married 
-0.039 
(0.050) 
-0.048 
(0.051) 
-0.117** 
(0.055) 
-0.045 
(0.055) 
-0.100 
(0.061) 
Race
1 
     
Black 
-0.245*** 
(0.067) 
-0.260*** 
(0.069) 
-0.135* 
(0.073) 
-0.265*** 
(0.077) 
-0.139* 
(0.084) 
Other 
-0.392*** 
(0.124) 
-0.368*** 
(0.127) 
-0.296** 
(0.131) 
-0.384*** 
(0.138) 
-0.320** 
(0.145) 
Policy 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0004* 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Premium/Income 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
Edu 
0.086*** 
(0.008) 
0.080*** 
(0.008) 
0.063*** 
(0.009) 
0.071*** 
(0.009) 
0.050*** 
(0.010) 
Total income
2 
     
[$5,000, $25,000] -0.201 -0.297 -0.558** -0.350 -0.532** 
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(0.190) (0.193) (0.215) (0.219) (0.241) 
[$25,000, $50,000] 
0.217 
(0.191) 
0.073 
(0.195) 
-0.262 
(0.217) 
-0.011 
(0.220) 
-0.277 
(0.242) 
[$50,000, 
$100,000] 
0.429** 
(0.193) 
0.262 
(0.198) 
-0.143 
(0.220) 
0.162 
(0.222) 
-0.175 
(0.245) 
$100,000 < 
0.555*** 
(0.197) 
0.397** 
(0.201) 
-0.061 
(0.224) 
0.272 
(0.226) 
-0.108 
(0.249) 
Employment
3 
     
WrkFT 
-0.030 
(0.084) 
-0.166* 
(0.088) 
-0.109 
(0.095) 
0.167* 
(0.095) 
-0.102 
(0.103) 
WrkPT 
-0.051 
(0.118) 
-0.107 
(0.120) 
-0.172 
(0.128) 
-0.137 
(0.128) 
-0.198 
(0.137) 
Ret 
0.181** 
(0.072) 
0.122* 
(0.074) 
0.116 
(0.079) 
0.136* 
(0.080) 
0.140 
(0.086) 
Disabled 
-0.120 
(0.178) 
-0.033 
(0.184) 
0.057 
(0.198) 
0.080 
(0.218) 
0.101 
(0.234) 
Mcare  
0.019 
(0.072) 
0.000 
(0.078) 
0.035 
(0.088) 
-0.014 
(0.096) 
Mcaid  
-0.352*** 
(0.102) 
-0.264** 
(0.115) 
-0.281** 
(0.123) 
-0.171 
(0.137) 
Emcov   
0.117*** 
(0.048) 
0.092* 
(0.051) 
0.151*** 
(0.052) 
0.124** 
(0.055) 
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Lifins  
0.333*** 
(0.047) 
0.344*** 
(0.050) 
0.304*** 
(0.051) 
0.319*** 
(0.055) 
Wealth
4 
     
[$5,000, $25,000]   
0.067 
(0.141) 
 
0.258 
(0.163) 
[$25,000, $75,000]   
0.115 
(0.132) 
 
0.171 
(0.152) 
[$75,000, 
$200,000] 
  
0.272** 
(0.127) 
 
0.365** 
(0.146) 
$200,000 <   
0.635*** 
(0.128) 
 
0.720*** 
(0.149) 
Residence
5 
     
Rent   
-0.034 
(0.091) 
 
-0.071 
(0.100) 
Freerent   
-0.260 
(0.187) 
 
-0.425* 
(0.218) 
Othome   
0.090 
(0.162) 
 
0.093 
(0.190) 
Health      
Healthy     
0.177 
(0.112) 
0.125 
(0.122) 
ADL    -0.046 -0.058 
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(0.048) (0.053) 
IADL    
-0.187* 
(0.091) 
-0.196** 
(0.100) 
Mobil    
-0.030 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.024) 
Memrye    
0.286 
(0.476) 
0.466 
(0.512) 
Memryc    
-0.058 
(0.521) 
-0.248 
(0.573) 
Child     
-0.009 
(0.012) 
Bro      
-0.024 
(0.020) 
Sis      
0.005 
(0.019) 
Prob75    
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Prob 85    
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Intercept 
-3.516*** 
(0.354) 
-3.509*** 
(0.422) 
-3.107*** 
(0.466) 
-3.507*** 
(0.555) 
-2.870*** 
(0.620) 
Sample size: 4,267. 
Note: 
1: The reference group is white. 
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2: The reference group is total income < $5,000. 
3: The reference group is not in the labor force. 
4: The reference group is total wealth < $5,000. 
5: The reference group is home owners. 
***significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table B. 5. Nearest available matching on the estimated propensity score 
Model Age Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4 
Model 1 51-60 22.5% 22.2% 22.5% 22.7% 
 61-70 25.0 24.2 25.1 24.4 
 71-80 20.9 22.4 22.1 21.7 
 Total 22.6 22.5 23.0 22.6 
Model 2 51-60 21.4 22.1 22.3 21.6 
 61-70 25.5 26.2 25.7 25.5 
 71-80 21.1 21.6 22.8 21.2 
 Total 22.2 22.6 22.9 22.4 
Model 3 51-60 19.6 20.2 20.2 20.2 
 61-70 23.1 23.3 23.8 23.2 
 71-80 18.8 19.5 18.9 19.0 
 Total 20.1 20.2 20.4 20.1 
Model 4 51-60 18.7 18.3 18.9 18.7 
 61-70 23.3 23.5 23.7 23.5 
 71-80 20.3 20.1 19.1 19.0 
 Total 19.6 19.9 19.6 19.5 
Model 5 51-60 16.7 16.9 17.7 17.8 
 61-70 20.2 20.3 20.8 20.9 
100 
 
 
 71-80 15.5 15.8 15.5 16.6 
 Total 16.5 16.7 16.9 17.2 
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Table B. 6. Bundorf & Pauly’s Method – Policy 1 
  Age Threshold Probability  
    P = 0.5 P = 0.6 P = 0.7 
Model 1 
    
 
51 - 60 18.4% 11.0% 1.9% 
 
61 - 70 44.8 46.6 43.5 
 
71 - 80 26.6 31.3 40.4 
  Total 36.2 18.7 7.6 
Model 2 
    
 
51 - 60 19.0 14.1 3.0 
 
61 - 70 42.5 43.7 41.8 
 
71 - 80 27.0 32.9 41.2 
  Total 35.6 20.1 7.8 
Model 3 
    
 
51 - 60 22.3 16.6 4.5 
 
61 - 70 41.3 42.2 42.4 
 
71 - 80 25.6 28.8 37.9 
 
Total 39.6 23.2 9.4 
Model 4 
    
 
51 - 60 18.5 13.4 2.0 
 
61 - 70 41.9 45.6 42.9 
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71 - 80 27.9 30.6 41.6 
 
Total 42.0 23.0 9.0 
Model 5 
    
 
51 - 60 21.7 15.9 9.6 
 
61 - 70 42.0 42.1 40.5 
 
71 - 80 25.6 30.2 35.4 
 
Total 44.2 26.3 11.8 
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Table B. 7. Bundorf & Pauly’s Method – Policy 2 
  Age Threshold Probability  
    P = 0.5 P = 0.6 P = 0.7 
Model 1 
    
 
51 - 60 18.4% 11.0% 1.9% 
 
61 - 70 44.8 46.6 43.5 
 
71 - 80 26.6 31.3 40.4 
  Total 36.2 18.7 7.6 
Model 2 
    
 
51 - 60 19.0 14.1 3.0 
 
61 - 70 42.5 43.7 41.8 
 
71 - 80 27.0 32.9 41.2 
  Total 35.6 20.1 7.8 
Model 3 
    
 
51 - 60 22.3 16.6 4.5 
 
61 - 70 41.3 42.2 42.4 
 
71 - 80 25.6 28.8 37.9 
 
Total 39.6 23.2 9.4 
Model 4 
    
 
51 - 60 18.4 13.4 2.0 
 
61 - 70 42.0 45.6 42.9 
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71 - 80 27.8 30.6 41.6 
 
Total 42.1 23.0 9.0 
Model 5 
    
 
51 - 60 21.7 15.9 9.6 
 
61 - 70 42.0 42.1 40.5 
 
71 - 80 25.6 30.2 35.3 
 
Total 44.2 26.3 11.8 
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Table B. 8. Bundorf & Pauly’s Method – Policy 3 
  Age Threshold Probability  
    P = 0.5 P = 0.6 P = 0.7 
Model 1 
    
 
51 - 60 18.5% 11.2% 1.9% 
 
61 - 70 44.3 47.5 42.9 
 
71 - 80 26.1 29.6 40.4 
  Total 36.5 18.4 7.6 
Model 2 
    
 
51 - 60 19.0 14.4 3.1 
 
61 - 70 42.1 43.3 41.4 
 
71 - 80 26.7 32.7 41.4 
  Total 35.9 20.1 7.7 
Model 3 
    
 
51 - 60 22.6 16.7 4.6 
 
61 - 70 41.5 42.1 43.1 
 
71 - 80 25.3 28.7 36.8 
 
Total 39.5 23.1 9.3 
Model 4 
    
 
51 - 60 18.6 13.4 2.0 
 
61 - 70 41.8 45.5 43.1 
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71 - 80 27.7 30.3 41.2 
 
Total 42.1 23.1 8.9 
Model 5 
    
 
51 - 60 21.7 15.9 9.5 
 
61 - 70 41.9 42.1 40.2 
 
71 - 80 25.6 30.2 35.2 
 
Total 44.3 26.3 11.9 
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Table B. 9. Bundorf & Pauly’s Method – Policy 4 
  Age Threshold Probability  
    P = 0.5 P = 0.6 P = 0.7 
Model 1 
    
 
51 - 60 18.5% 11.3% 1.9% 
 
61 - 70 44.3 47.6 42.9 
 
71 - 80 26.1 29.7 40.4 
  Total 36.5 18.3 7.6 
Model 2 
    
 
51 - 60 19.0 14.3 3.1 
 
61 - 70 42.1 43.4 41.4 
 
71 - 80 26.7 32.6 41.4 
  Total 35.9 20.1 7.7 
Model 3 
    
 
51 - 60 22.6 16.7 4.6 
 
61 - 70 41.5 42.1 43.4 
 
71 - 80 25.3 28.7 36.4 
 
Total 39.5 23.1 9.2 
Model 4 
    
 
51 - 60 18.6 13.4 2.0 
 
61 - 70 41.8 45.5 43.1 
108 
 
 
 
71 - 80 27.7 30.3 41.2 
 
Total 42.1 23.1 8.9 
Model 5 
    
 
51 - 60 21.7 15.9 9.5 
 
61 - 70 41.9 42.1 40.2 
 
71 - 80 25.6 30.2 35.2 
 
Total 44.3 26.3 11.9 
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Nationwide there are fewer than 7 million long-term care (LTC) insurance policies in 
force. Why do so few Americans buy private long-term care (LTC) insurance?  Several 
theories have been offered as possible explanations, including the availability of 
Medicaid, misperceptions that Medicare or other policies cover LTC, beliefs that one‟s 
own risk of needing LTC services is small, or desires to simply rely on children and 
spouses for LTC.  This study examines another possible explanation – that private LTC 
insurance is simply “unaffordable” for most older Americans, which may be why they 
don‟t buy it.   
This study begins by investigating the meaning of affordability in the context of 
private LTC insurance. I propose several definitions for affordability, drawing on 
concepts recently developed to gauge the affordability of acute-care health insurance and 
housing. Then using nationally representative data from the ongoing Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) and the Rand HRS data the study examines the incidence of 
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“unaffordability” of LTC insurance premiums among Americans over age 50, given each 
of our alternative definitions for it.  I consider definitions for affordability, first, based on 
simple normative standards, such as whether remaining household income after paying 
for LTC insurance is above some (arbitrarily-set) threshold, and ratio definition, such as 
whether the ratio of premiums to income is less than some target amount, and more 
behavioral definitions of affordability, such as whether other adults with similar 
economic, demographic, and family circumstances are seen to purchase LTC insurance. 
In each case, the affordability definitions take into account the steep positive relationship 
between LTC insurance premiums and age-at-time-of-purchase. This analysis offers 
researchers and policymakers an operational framework for defining affordability, and 
for evaluating its relative importance as an explanation for non-purchase.  
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